



Notice of meeting of

Education Scrutiny Committee

To: Councillors Kirk (Chair), Alexander, Brooks (Vice-Chair),
Gunnell, Hyman, Merrett and Morley

Co-opted Statutory Members:

Mr John Bailey (Parent Governor Representative) and
Dr David Sellick (Church of England Representative)

Date: Tuesday, 19 June 2007

Time: 5.00 pm

Venue: The Guildhall, York

AGENDA

1. **Declarations of Interest** (Pages 1 - 2)

At this point Members are asked to declare any personal or prejudicial interests they may have in the business on this agenda. A list of general personal interests previously declared are attached.

2. **Minutes** (Pages 3 - 6)

To approve and sign the minutes of the last meeting of the Committee held on 28 March 2007.

3. **Public Participation**

At this point in the meeting members of the public who have registered their wish to speak regarding an item on the agenda or an issue within the Committee's remit can do so. Anyone who wishes to register or requires further information is requested to contact the Democracy Officer on the contact details listed at the foot of this agenda. The deadline for registering is Monday 18 June 2007 at 5.00pm.

4. Overview of Work Completed by Education Scrutiny Committee Since 2004 (Pages 7 - 18)

This report introduces Members of the Education Scrutiny Committee to the work previously completed by this Committee since 2004.

5. Security in Schools - Feasibility Report (Pages 19 - 82)

Members are asked to consider whether to carry out a scrutiny review of security in schools.

6. Urgent Business

Any other business which the Chair considers urgent under the Local Government Act 1972.

Democracy Officer:

Name: Louise Cook

Contact details:

- Telephone – (01904) 551027
- E-mail – louise.cook@york.gov.uk

For more information about any of the following please contact the Democracy Officer responsible for servicing this meeting

- Registering to speak
- Business of the meeting
- Any special arrangements
- Copies of reports

Contact details are set out above.

EDUCATION SCRUTINY COMMITTEE

Agenda item I: Declarations of interest.

Please state any amendments you have to your declarations of interest:

Co-opted statutory members

Dr D Sellick – Governor of Derwent Infant and Junior School

Mr J Bailey – Governor of Huntington School and Huntington Primary School

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City of York Council

Minutes

MEETING

EDUCATION SCRUTINY COMMITTEE

DATE

28 MARCH 2007

PRESENT

COUNCILLORS HALL (CHAIR), BARTLETT,
MR J BAILEY (PARENT GOVERNOR
REPRESENTATIVE) AND DR D SELICK
(CHURCH OF ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVE)

APOLOGIES

COUNCILLORS KIND AND LIVESLEY

21. Declarations of Interest

The Chair invited Members to declare at this point any personal or prejudicial interests they might have in the business on the agenda.

Mr John Bailey stated that he was now also a governor at Huntington Primary School and requested the addition of this onto the standing list.

22. Minutes

RESOLVED: That the minutes of the meeting held on 27 February 2007 be approved and signed by the Chair as a correct record.

23. Public Participation

It was reported that there had been one registration to speak at the meeting under the Council's Public Participation Scheme from Cllr Scott.

Cllr Scott referred to his submission to the Committee in which he raised some concerns with the Home to School Transport Service draft report. In particular in draft Recommendation 1 relating to negotiations with the transport provider for St Mary's School, Askham Richard for the provision of seat belts to be provided on all vehicles but it stated "at a reasonable cost". He stated that he felt that reasonable cost should not be a factor in the provision of seat belts and that safety was the main concern. He also stated that assurances/guarantees should be obtained from suppliers of the services that vehicles currently used that met the Council's standards would not be switched. If no assurances were received then the supplier should be given notice. Finally he asked for the addition of a further recommendation that, as a matter of urgency, current contracts providing home to school transport for secondary schools should also be examined and reviewed to ensure the vehicles used had seatbelts fitted. He also felt that double decker buses should not be used for school transport as they were unsuitable for seat belt adaptation.

The Chair confirmed that the Education and Inspection Act meant that all Authorities would have to rewrite their contracts with suppliers in the future.

24. Home to School Transport Services - Final Report

Members gave further consideration to the final report and recommendations on Home to School Transport Services approved at the Committees meeting held on 27 February 2007.

The Scrutiny Officer confirmed that Scrutiny Management Committee had considered this Committees final report on Home to School Transport Services at their meeting held on 26 March. She reported that they had supported the Scrutiny Committees recommendations and had suggested that the Executive may also wish to consider the provision of seat belts on transport buses used by secondary school pupils. It was pointed out that this Committees remit had only referred to primary schools and had not extended to secondary schools.

Members further considered the final report at Annex A, they confirmed that Recommendation 2 ensured that contractors would not be able to switch vehicles for home to school transport and agreed the following amendments:

Recommendation 2

In part c) rewording to state: Contractors to ensure that all drivers have had a CRB check no later than 3 years before commencing this work and thereafter in line with current Council policy.

Recommendation 5

The deletion of the final words “wherever possible” of this recommendation and their replacement with “should be a high priority”.

RESOLVED: That, subject to the above amendments, the report be approved for submission to the Executive as the final report of the Education Scrutiny Committee on home to school transport.

REASON: So that the final report reflects Members’ views and to enable the Committee’s recommendations to be referred to the Executive.

25. Chairs Comments

The Chair thanked all those that had contributed to the production of the report for their work on this topic which had enabled the Committee to make recommendations that would, in the long term, improve the quality of the buses used for school transport.

CLLR C HALL

Chair of Scrutiny Committee

The meeting started at 5.00 pm and finished at 5.40 pm.

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Education Scrutiny Committee

19 June 2007

Report of the Head of Civic Democratic & Legal Services

Overview of work completed by Education Scrutiny Committee since 2004

Summary

1. This report introduces Members of the Education Scrutiny Committee to the work previously completed by this Committee since 2004.

Background

2. The Council's Constitution places a responsibility on Scrutiny Committees to report annually to Scrutiny Management Committee. In each municipal year these reports are incorporated in to an Annual Review report to Council together with information on all the ad-hoc scrutiny reviews completed that year. Scrutiny Management Committee (SMC) has responsibility for the production for this annual review and its purpose is to summarise progress in delivering the annual scrutiny plan, highlight key achievements, learning points and the key issues to be addressed in the coming year.

Consultation

3. Although not relevant for the production of this report, consultation was undertaken as part of all the reviews referred to in the annexes attached to this report i.e. excerpts from the annual review reports from 2004-05 and 2005-06 attached as annexes A & B respectively, and update reports provided by the Chair of Education Scrutiny Committee to SMC during 2006-07 as annexes C & D.

Options

4. To facilitate their knowledge and learning, Members may request further information on the previously completed reviews and/or copies of the relevant final reports.

Analysis

5. The Education Scrutiny Committee together with the Health Scrutiny Committee, are currently the only two permanent Scrutiny bodies in existence within City of York Council. They have both had a stable and committed membership and programme of work, which has enabled productive

relationships with officers from the relevant directorates and outside organisations.

Corporate Objectives

6. The work of the Education Scrutiny Committee is aimed at Corporate Priority 5 i.e. 'To increase people's skills and knowledge to improve future employment prospects' and Corporate Priority 10 i.e. 'Improving our organisational effectiveness'.

Implications

7. There are no known Financial, HR, Equalities, Legal, Crime and Disorder, IT or other implications associated with the recommendation of this report.

Risk Management

8. In compliance with the Councils risk management strategy. There are no risks associated with the recommendations of this report.

Recommendations

9. Members are asked to note the contents of the attached reports

Reason: In order to be fully informed on scrutiny reviews completed by Education Scrutiny Committee during the last three years.

Contact Details

Author:

Melanie Carr
Scrutiny Officer
Scrutiny Services
Tel No. 01904 552063

Chief Officer Responsible for the report:

Dawn Steel
Democratic Services Manager

Report Approved



Date

7 June 2007

Wards Affected:

All

For further information please contact the author of the report

Background Papers: None

Annexes

Annex A - Excerpt from the annual review reports from 2004-05

Annex B - Excerpt from the annual review reports from 2005-06

Annex C – Update from the Chair of Education Scrutiny Committee to SMC on 20/11/06

Annex D - Update from the Chair of Education Scrutiny Committee to SMC on 23/04/07

EDUCATION SCRUTINY BOARD

The Board, which is comprised of seven Members and four statutory co-optees, has worked very well together in 2003/4. We are fortunate in that the board has an excellent mix of people in terms of knowledge, skills and experience. The Board's officer support, particularly from Education Directorate, has been key to our success.

The board spent much of the year considering the topic of Post-16 Inclusion. This topic had been identified in an earlier scrutiny of pre-16 inclusion as a vital area to consider. The scope considered the outcomes for young people when they leave compulsory education. The scope of the topic was restricted to those people with a statement of special educational (SEN) needs in an age range of 14 to 19. Successful outcomes for young statemented people may include education, training or employment. The Board were involved with gathering a very wide range of evidence. Some evidence was taken from the Local Education Authority (LEA) and a large amount was gathered with other organizations outside the LEA such as Connexions, York College and the North Yorkshire Business and Education Partnership.

The Post-16 Inclusion topic report was recommended to the Executive Member for Education in March 2005 and published on the Council's web in April 2005. The report concluded that the City of York was better than the UK average at delivering a successful outcome for these young people. The report identified key SEN groups where outcomes could be improved and identified key points when action could be focussed. The report

included a total of fourteen improvement recommendations. I have made regular updates on progress to the Scrutiny Management Committee.

I am very pleased with the continuing hard work, commitment and enthusiasm of everyone on (and associated with) Education Scrutiny Board. Well done and congratulations on the year's contributions.

Cllr Glen Bradley
Chair, Education Scrutiny Board

Education Scrutiny Board

| | |
|------------|-----------------------------|
| Chair | Cllr Glen Bradley |
| Vice Chair | Cllr Keith Aspden |
| | Cllr Ian Cuthbertson |
| | Cllr Janet Hopton |
| | Cllr Viv Kind |
| | Cllr David Livesley |
| | Cllr David Scott |
| Co-optee | Dr G M Clayton |
| Co-optee | Ms L M MacLeod |
| Co-optee | Dr David Sellick |
| Co-optee | Miss C Duffy |

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Education Scrutiny Board

The Board has focused its attention in two key areas this year. Firstly in reviewing the progress of recommendations of the two earlier topics of Early Years Education and Post 16 Inclusion. Secondly the Board undertook the new topic of Extended Schools provision in York.

I feel it is important to undertake reviews of previous topics in order for the Board to learn from the process. It is key to understand the outcome of the work and that the recommendations of previous topics were practical and had made a difference to people and learning in the City.

A review of the progress of its recommendations made in the **Early Years Education** and the **Post 16 Inclusion** topics was undertaken, the Board had made recommendations for improvements in this vital area. I am pleased to report that great progress had been made on the recommendations and the Board were very satisfied with the outcomes.

During 2005/6 the majority of the Board's time was spent on the new **Extended Schools** topic. Extended schools are those that provide a wider range of services and activities, often beyond the traditional school day to help meet the needs of pupils, families and the community.

Extended schools are high on the agenda both nationally and across the City. There is an ever growing need for extended schools. York has set itself challenging targets to ensure every school is an extended school by 2010.

The topic had clear objectives on how well York is performing in the provision and if it is meeting the needs of the pupils, families and the community. It was carefully scoped to consider Primary schools because this was considered the most vital area in terms of need and was generally the school nearest to the communities.

The Board undertook a significant amount of evidence gathering from a wide range of sources including; Officers' reports and presentations, considering

extended schools research papers, attendance of the York Extended Schools Conference and visiting seven different Primary schools including one from another Authority. It was a great pleasure to meet all those involved with extended schools.

At the end of the 2005/6 Municipal year, the Board was considering its draft recommendations as an example the Board are likely to recommend supporting the policy that all schools are extended schools by 2010 and that a local clustering approach be taken where appropriate. I would like to recognise that York has made great progress on extended schools to date and thank all those who have worked so well together.

I trust that the recommendations will help make a difference across the City. I would finally like to give thanks to the people on the Board and those who helped with our evidence gathering for their commitment and hard work.

Cllr Glen Bradley
Chair, Education Scrutiny Board

Education Scrutiny Board

| | |
|------------|----------------------------|
| Chair | Cllr Glen Bradley |
| Vice Chair | Cllr Keith Aspden |
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| | Cllr David Scott |
| Co-optee | Dr G M Clayton |
| Co-optee | Dr David Sellick |
| Co-optee | Miss C Duffy |



Scrutiny Management Committee**20 November 2006****Report of the Head of Civic, Democratic and Legal Services****Update on Work of Education Scrutiny Committee****Summary**

1. The Education Scrutiny Committee's final report on the Extended School service in York has already been considered by the Executive. Members of the Education Scrutiny Committee are now considering home-to-school transport contracts and how pupil safety can be maximised. They are also interested in the role and training of school governors and expect to carry out work in this area in 2007. The Chair of Education Scrutiny Committee will be attending the meeting to update Members on and answer any questions relating to the Committee's work.

Background

2. At their meeting on 12 September 2006 the Executive agreed the recommendations of the Education Scrutiny Committee in their final report on the Extended School Service in York. This concentrated on primary schools and the decisions will result in extended school provision being developed in accordance with community needs, community activities being supported in schools by the introduction of a more flexible lettings policy and support and training being delivered to update the knowledge and skills of staff and governors. Free provision for children may be extended and parenting support improved if the pathfinder bids that this report recommended Council applies for are successful.
3. The Committee are now reviewing the home-to-school transport service. This is concentrating on primary schools and will examine the implications of introducing seat belts onto all buses which transport pupils to primary schools in York. Discussions will take place with contractors and enquiries will be made of other local authorities as to how they introduced them, including the issue of how to ensure that children wear the safety belts when they are provided.
4. The Committee has an outstanding Scrutiny topic on the role of school governors. It is hoped that this will be progressed early in 2007 when the officers in Children's Services have more capacity to support it. Prior to this it is expected that information on changes to the role of school governors will soon be presented to a meeting of Children's Services EMAP.

Consultation

5. Members of the Education Scrutiny Committee have been in close consultation with the Early Years team in order to complete their successful scrutiny of the Extended Schools service. They are now working with the Education Access team to progress their review of school transport and will be consulting externally as detailed above.

Options

6. Members may receive this report and ask any relevant questions of the Chairman of the Education Scrutiny Committee.

Analysis

7. The Education Scrutiny Committee is one of only two standing Scrutiny Committees and its work so far has resulted in decisions which will lead to improvements in community provision in schools and the services offered to primary age children. Members of this committee are managing their workload so that they can deliver clear and positive recommendations that can make measurable improvements in a short period of time.

Corporate Priorities

8. The report is relevant to Corporate Priority 5 – Increase people's skills and knowledge to improve future employment prospects and Corporate Priority 7 - Improve the health and lifestyles of the people who live in York, in particular among groups whose levels of health are the poorest.

Implications

9. There are no known Financial, HR, Equalities, Legal, Crime and Disorder, IT or other implications at this stage.

Risk Management

10. In compliance with the Councils risk management strategy, there are no known risks associated with the recommendations of this report.

Recommendations

11. Members are asked to receive the report on the progress of the Education Scrutiny Committee.

Reason: in order to meet the delegated authority of Scrutiny Management Committee as defined in CYC's constitution.

Contact Details:**Author:**

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Chief Officer Responsible for the report:

Suzan Hemingway
Head of Civic, Democratic and Legal Services

Report Approved**Date**

10.11.06

Wards Affected:**All**

For further information please contact the author of the report

Annexes

None

Background Papers

None

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**Education Scrutiny Committee Update For Annual Report
2006/2007 as of 23 April 2007**

Extended Schools Review

The Education Scrutiny Committee at their meetings in June and July finalised their scrutiny of the topic on Extended Schools which had the following remit:

- To establish if school in York are providing extended services beyond the school day.
- To consider if this provision is meeting the needs of pupils, parents and the wider community
- To investigate example of good practice from within this Authority and beyond
- To make recommendations as to how the Council can work with partners across the City and how schools can work together so that children and communities can receive the best possible service

After many months of work during which a wide range of evidence was gathered through visits to a great many of our primary schools, the review found that the need for extended schools in York is growing and the final report confirmed that the city is performing well in this vital area.

The final report made a number of recommendations and supported the LEA's plans to achieve a situation where every school in York would be an extended school. This was presented to the Scrutiny Management Committee on 24th July 2006 and subsequently to the Executive on 12th September where it was accepted.

Home to School Transport Review

The Education Scrutiny Committee have recently completed a review of Home to School Transport. The agreed remit for this topic was as follows:

- To investigate if improvements can be made to the safety of buses transporting school pupils to primary schools.
- To consider the contract that is negotiated by the council for the provision of school transport services.
- To make enquiries as to the school transport that is provided in other local authorities including the use of dedicated 'yellow buses'.
- To investigate the implications of installing seat belts in all buses contracted to carry primary school pupils.

Throughout the scrutiny of this topic all the participants operated in a frank, positive and focussed way as a result of having a clear remit for their investigation. All the transport contractors were very open regarding the contracts and the financial implications of varying the type of vehicles provided. All participating members

were motivated to ensure that their recommendations were based on sound evidence obtained from the scrutiny process.

There has been a marked variation in the type and quality of vehicles used for transporting primary school children to and from school in the past and the recommendations if implemented would ensure that all pupils receive the same provision.

The final report attempted to make recommendations that will in the long term improve the quality of the buses used for home to school transport, improve the safety of the pupils being transported, improve behaviour, reduce traffic congestion and environmental pollution and encourage the uptake of places on school buses.

A detailed analysis of the evidence collected was included in the Final Report submitted to the Scrutiny Management Committee on 26 March 2007 and the approved report will be considered by the Executive on 24 April 2007.

Cllr Charles Hall



Education Scrutiny Committee

19 June 2007

Security In Schools – Feasibility Report

Summary

1. Members are asked to consider carrying out a scrutiny review of security in schools.

Criteria

2. This topic was registered by former Councillor Charles Hall prior to the local election (see registration form attached at Annex A) and this proposed topic fits with the following eligibility criteria:
 - Public Interest i.e. in terms of being in the public interest and residents perceptions
 - In keeping with Corporate Priorities
 - Level of Risk to the Council

Consultation

3. The Executive Member for Children's Services and key officers were asked to comment on the feasibility of this scrutiny review:
4. Executive Member for Children's Services
Having visited every school in the city at least once, I can confirm that every school pays careful attention to security. In primary schools, in particular, doors are locked and a careful check is made as visitors enter and leave the building. Even in large secondary schools, a careful record of visitor movement is kept, as is the movement of students, even those in the sixth forms, as they enter and leave the school buildings. As a school governor, I know that the responsibility for safety and security rests with the governing body and that the Local Authority can only offer advice. This they do through the Health and Safety Officers and via such bodies as Safer York Partnership.
5. Police Officers and PCSOs are often in our schools, getting to know the children and young people and emphasising safety matters to them. I have been working with the police to progress the idea of 'police desks' in schools, thus making police officers more visible and accessible to both the school community and the wider community around the school. I feel this is an important step in ensuring that police officers are seen in their neighbourhoods and are easily accessible to all.

6. I feel that at the present time and after various incidents in recent years, school governing bodies take this topic very seriously indeed, seeking appropriate advice as required. Due to the wide availability of such advice and the general raising of awareness and higher standards now adopted by schools - where the responsibility clearly lies - I do not feel this is a scrutiny topic which it would be worthwhile to pursue at this time. I am quite sure that help and guidance will continue to be issued by the police and the local authority and that the governing bodies of our schools will continue to act upon it.
7. Assistant Director (Resource Management) Learning, Culture & Children's Services
Any review of current policy is useful but in regard to school security there is already a lot of information available to support schools. The answer to improved security in and around a school does not lie solely with the school but also with the engagement of the wider community. The Police and local authority Youth Services also play a key part in deterring anti-social behaviour etc and each would need to be involved to effect a useful review.
8. Head of Planning & Resources, Learning Culture & Children's Services
Designing out potential security risks has to be weighed against the aesthetic value of a building. For example, last year City of York Council completed new builds for three primary schools. At Hob Moor, the new school building was given metal shutters at the windows. This aspect of security technology was written into the design to deter vandalism but it gives the building a very austere look that does not suggest a welcoming and open friendly environment. Other security measures were included in the three new schools to increase the personal safety of children, staff and visitors. This type of security by design is recognised as the way forward and all future new school buildings will include these features.
9. The requirements of the local planning authority sometimes contradict designs that include security features e.g. the height of railings around a school, and there is a balance, which must be sought to deter misuse of a school environment whilst encouraging further use of school buildings by the wider community.
10. CYC Health & Safety Advisor
City of York Council is due to commence an internal authority wide Health and Safety audit of services including schools. Part of this process includes compliance with corporate policies including risk assessment, lone working and violence and aggression. Actions plans will be left with each Service and results will be fed back to Directorate Management Teams. The audit process will identify missing risk assessments including those related to security. Guidance will be given on what further risk assessments are required by legislation and future audits will check that these have been put in place.
11. City of York Council is also in the process of creating of a set of corporate Health & Safety procedures that will cover security issues and will apply to all City of York Council buildings including schools.

Security in Schools on a National Basis

12. In 2003 the DfES commissioned a study of the implementation of the Capital Modernisation Fund for school security 2002-2003. The study identified the key security concerns of Local Education Authorities. These included the personal safety of staff, pupils and visitors to school premises and external incidents such as intrusion to school premises, vandalism, arson and burglary. A copy of this report is attached at Annex B.
13. Specific responsibility for security in schools is not set down in legislation. Security is a health and safety issue and whoever has responsibility for health and safety needs to consider what security measures are necessary to ensure, as far as reasonable practicable, the safety of staff, pupils and visitors – see Annex C.
14. Many lessons have been learnt since the stabbing of a head teacher in December 1995. The Secretary of State has set up a Working Group on School Security (WGSS). Its membership includes the employers' organisation, the churches, unions, governors, parents, police and government agencies and its remit is 'To identify good practice in maintaining security in schools, including effective ways of handling incidents, to advise on dissemination and to make recommendations. Consideration will include the role of relevant external agencies, ways of involving parents and the local community and the effectiveness of current legislation'. The WGSS has made a number of recommendations e.g. that each school designate a member of staff as school security co-ordinator to help formalise existing security arrangements. Schools across the country have implemented many of their recommendations and some are still ongoing.
15. The Health & Safety Executive and DfES have produced guidance for schools covering a wide range of Health & Safety and school security issues.
16. In order to identify factors that influence crime and anti-social behaviour, the Home Office has produced a Crime Reduction Toolkit aimed specifically at Schools & Hospitals. It provides a practical guide to understanding the reasons that crimes and incidents occur in and around these types of buildings and provides information on how to tackle these problems through design or management of premises.
17. It is recognised that there are ways in which the environment can influence the likelihood of crimes and incidents occurring, through the design of buildings and spaces. This is the principle at the heart of 'crime prevention through environmental design' (CPTED). Crime prevention measures can either be physical measures to strengthen the building or measures that improve the design of the facility itself to discourage criminal behaviour.
18. For public buildings like schools, there are a series of typical issues that need consideration. These are:
 - **Controlling access between public and private spaces** - The way in which movement is controlled in a public building can have important

consequences on the vulnerability of the site to crime. Schools must allow access in order to perform their purpose, however there are spaces that should not be accessible to intruders. Controlling where people can and cannot go is a key issue for crime prevention.

- **Surveillance** - It is easier for offenders to commit crime if they cannot be seen at any stage of the criminal act, or if they believe that they may not be interrupted. Developments where the design limits the ability to see what is taking place will be more likely to suffer from crime and anti-social behaviour. Surveillance analysis is used in crime prevention to quantify the protection of 'eyes on the street' from both users of the building and passers-by from the local community (natural surveillance). CCTV (artificial surveillance) can also be beneficial in providing surveillance but the level of protection it provides is dependent upon monitoring and the response protocol adopted. The Crime Prevention Toolkit provides a method, which can identify the level by which a building and its surroundings support or hinder these three issues and methods to improve safety and security in the building and site.
- **Site management** - The way in which a site is managed can have important consequences not just on the level of protection against crime but also on the perceived vulnerability of the site for both potential offenders and users. Evidence of poor maintenance and bad management can itself send strong signals to a potential offender that little care is being taken of a building. In this way, places with minor problems (such as an act of vandalism left un-repaired for a long time) contribute towards creating an environment where crimes of greater frequency and severity occur. It is essential that a programmed management and maintenance system be in place. This system must be *seen* to maintain the physical quality of the environment and actively respond to problems or needs expressed by the users.
- **Crime generators** – managers of schools need to be aware of their surrounding environment and the particular problems that may arise from it.

Security in York Schools

19. In an effort to understand the types of crime and anti-social behaviour that occur in and around York Schools, North Yorkshire Police have provided some statistical information for 2006-07 – see Annex D. Historically, York does not have a significant problem with vandalism / criminal damage to school buildings, but there are hotspots, which the statistics identify.
20. In York, the responsibility for Health & Safety, and security in schools has been devolved to individual schools and is covered within the individual school's Asset Management Plan. Each school can choose how to spend its annual budget and each school has its own set of policies, some of which cover school security e.g. Access arrangements covering controlled reception areas and secure playing fields etc. The Local Education Authority (LA) can advise schools on security measures but cannot insist that money is spent on

improvements. This does not preclude other unilateral works that the LA may help to finance e.g. removal of asbestos from school buildings. The difficulty of insisting that all LA schools meet a minimum standard on security measures would be the resulting cost to the Council over and above that to which it is already committed.

21. The security technology written into the design of the three new primary schools took into account the modern day requirements of a school in an effort to achieve a good balance between constructing a safe and secure building against the need to provide the right kind of environment for learning and encourage the extended use of the facilities by the wider community.
22. York has also been selected as one of 25 pathfinder authorities invited to build a single new secondary school under the Building Schools for the Future (BSF) programme. The DfES will expect the scheme to use the Design Quality Indicator for Schools which will feed into the design all the required elements including security measures. City of York Council always consults with the Safer York Partnership on any major capital projects and the pathfinder will be no exception.

Conduct of Review

23. The research report commissioned by the DfES found that while schools were increasingly responsible for the implementation of security measures, they and their LEAs indicated others who played specific roles in school security. They included:
 - . **Police** — in particular, Crime Prevention and Schools' Officers.
 - . **Fire and Rescue Services** — in particular, Fire Safety Officers.
 - . **Building Control Bodies** — the design and construction of school buildings is currently a matter for control by the *Building Regulations 2000* and the supporting Approved Documents to those Regulations. These may soon contain recommendations regarding security measures to be considered amongst other safety issues as part of any new school building project or programme.
 - . **Local Authority Officers** — including Health and Safety, Risk Management, Property Services, Capital Programming, Architects and Planning representatives.
 - . **Service Providers** — such as insurers, equipment providers and maintenance contractors.
 - . **Consultants** — for example; in security, insurance and risk assessment.
 - . **Community Representatives** — to a lesser extent, but, where used, providing valuable inputs.
24. Therefore, if a decision were taken to carry out this review, it would be necessary to involve representatives from these groups either as expert witnesses or as co-optees.

Implications

25. There are no Financial, HR, Equality, Legal or other implications associated with the recommendation made within this report.

Risk Management

26. There are no known risks associated with the recommendation made below.

Recommendations

27. As security in schools has been devolved down to individual school level, and as there are already many sources of guidance and assistance available to schools, it is difficult to see any value in carrying out this review. Therefore it is recommended that this topic does not proceed to review.

Contact Details

Author:

Melanie Carr
Scrutiny Officer
Scrutiny Services
Tel No. 01904 552063

Chief Officer Responsible for the report:

Suzan Hemingway
Head of Civic, Democratic & Legal Services

Feasibility Study Approved **Date** 7 June 2007

Wards Affected:

All



For further information please contact the author of the report

Background Papers:

Annexes:

Annex A – Topic Registration Form

Annex B - DfES commissioned research report to study the implementation of the Capital Modernisation Fund for school security 2002-2003

Annex C – Information on Responsibility for Health & Safety In Schools

Annex D – Statistical Information from North Yorkshire Police

Scrutiny Topic Registration Form

- * **Proposed topic:** Security in Schools
 * **Councillor registering the topic** Councillor Charles Hall

Please complete this section as thoroughly as you can. The information provided will help Scrutiny Officers and Scrutiny Members to assess the following key elements to the success of any scrutiny review:

- How** a review should best be undertaken given the subject
Who needs to be involved
What should be looked at
By when it should be achieved; and
Why we are doing it ?

Please describe how the proposed topic fits with 3 of the eligibility criteria attached.

| | Yes? | Policy Development & Review | Service Improvement & Delivery | Accountability of Executive Decisions |
|--|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Public Interest (ie. in terms of both proposals being in the public interest and resident perceptions) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Under Performance / Service Dissatisfaction | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| In keeping with corporate priorities | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Level of Risk | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Service Efficiency | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*** Set out briefly the purpose of any scrutiny review of your proposed topic. What do you think it should achieve?**

To identify improvements that can be made to our school security systems to reduce the risk of and cost of repairing the results of vandalism and improve the safety of school users whether pupils, staff or members of the community using school facilities. The extended schools agenda means that schools are open for longer hours and used by greater numbers of people. This can result in greater pressure on the security systems and increase risk of anti-social behaviour and crime which will adversely affect the uptake of community activities within school.

*** Please explain briefly what you think any scrutiny review of your proposed topic should cover.**

Incidents that have occurred over the last two years, police response times, the costs involved. Examples of good practice in other local authorities and other public buildings.

Possibility of integrating security into building design for new or schools or extensions to existing ones. Suggestions for improved security in existing schools.

*** Please indicate which other Councils, partners or external services could, in your opinion, participate in the review, saying why.**

Security experts, other local authorities, officers from Education, contractors, local emergency services etc

*** Explain briefly how, in your opinion, such a review might be most efficiently undertaken?**

Audit of current provision in York schools. Examples from other areas. Presentations from security experts, emergency services, building contractors, architects etc. Parents, governors, staff and other users of York schools.

Estimate the timescale for completion.

- 1-3 months
- 3-6 months
- 6-9 months

Support documents or other useful information

Date submitted: Tuesday, 24th April, 2007, 3.02 pm

Submitted by: Barbara Boyce on behalf of Cllr Charles Hall

Research Report
No 419

School Security Concerns

Richard Lloyd and Charlene Ching

GHK

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

GHK, in collaboration with IPSOS-RSL and with expert inputs from Tony Holden of the Holden McAllister Partnership and Dr Tim Pascoe of the Building Research Establishment, were commissioned by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) to undertake a study on the implementation of the Capital Modernisation Fund for school security 2002-2003.

The study allowed security concerns, the processes by which they are identified and responses formulated, and LEA views on the effectiveness of different measures to be examined. The information collected is intended to contribute to the development of future policy and practice in the field of school security.

Key Findings

The study identified that the current key security concerns as described by LEAs were:

- LEAs reported their key security concern as the personal safety of staff, pupils and visitors to schools premises.
- “External” incidents, including intrusion to school premises, vandalism, arson and burglary, were ranked higher in all incidents compared with “internal” threats. Intrusion was seen as the greatest of these concerns.
- While schools were increasingly responsible for the implementation of security measures, they, and their LEAs, described a combination of experiences of specific incidents and conducting more formal risk assessments in order to identify their key security concerns.
- In addition to LEAs and schools, those who played a key role in school security included the police, fire service, providers (insurers, equipment providers and maintenance contractors), consultants and community representatives. The benefits of a multi-agency approach was emphasised.
- Previous evaluation and review activities also informed the planning process, in terms of identifying measures which were considered to be effective and priority responses.
- LEAs and schools use a variety of funding sources to support their security measures.
- LEAs noted a number of effective solutions to school security problems. The most commonly cited were fencing, CCTV and access control systems. Non-capital measures noted included training, school management, strategic approaches and partnership working.
- While additional concerns were similar to the main areas described, pupil behaviour issues and their impact on school security in its widest sense were raised alongside perimeter security and the role of both staff and pupils in ensuring the safety of all persons on the school site.
- A series of key success factors were identified for promoting the security of schools: the frequent focusing of attention on security issues; a structured approach to considering security issues and responses; following a “think thief” approach, where planners consider

the premises and security from the criminal's viewpoint; reviewing school security strategies at least annually; making use of experts; and getting school staff and governors to take responsibility for their school's security – identification of need and implementation of solutions.

Aims and Objectives

The main research objectives were to provide:

- LEA perceptions of school security needs and the existence of school security policies and strategies. Key aspects of this enquiry included: identifying school security needs; the institutional framework within which these needs are addressed; and the influence of previous experience and lesson in proposing responses that are considered effective.

Methodology

The study included an assessment of the security concerns of schools, as perceived by their respective Local Education Authorities (LEAs), and featured a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches:

- **A postal survey of all LEAs** – with all 150 LEAs receiving a questionnaire including questions on their views of the main security concerns they face; the ways in which security needs are identified and addressed; measures considered particularly effective; and outstanding security issues and potential measures to address them. A total of 93 responses were received, a response rate of 61%.
- **Qualitative LEA case studies** – to examine CMF implementation issues and probe security needs and responses in more detail, case studies took place in five LEA areas. The case studies included interviews with LEA staff and visits to between two and three schools per area, undertaken on an anonymous basis.

School Security Concerns

The **key security concerns**, as reported by the LEAs, can be seen below. The most common concerns related to, in ranked order:

- The personal safety of staff, pupils and visitors to school premises – the most frequently prioritised and most highly ranked concerns.
- Intrusion to school premises – both during and after school hours.
- Vandalism, arson and burglary from external sources.
- Vandalism, arson and burglary from internal sources.
- Car crime – ranked as a minor concern for most LEAs, although this may be due to damage to vehicles being included under vandalism.

A difference in the level of concern between **'internal'** and **'external'** incidents was apparent, with **'external'** concerns being ranked highest. While these definitions are simplistic and not mutually exclusive, they refer to security concerns originating from within and outside the school respectively. The emphasis on external concerns also explained the high priority given to intrusion – a necessary precursor to acts of theft, vandalism and arson.

The case studies with LEAs and schools allowed both collective and individual concerns to be examined in greater detail. While the ranking of concerns between the LEAs varied, the emphasis on the personal safety of staff, pupils and visitors remained. At the individual school level concerns varied considerably – as would be expected given the combined nature of LEA responses. Even so, a broad resonance emerged with the overall findings of the study – and a range of examples of specific incidents and concerns were reported.

A simple '**hierarchy of preventative measures**' was proposed, working 'top down' or 'bottom up' depending on whether the threat is internal or external, and linking different preventative measures to threats. However, the simplistic nature of the hierarchy masked the interconnected and often complex links between the different concerns, which also influence the formulation of appropriate responses.

Identifying Concerns and Planning Responses

LEAs were asked to describe the processes by which school security concerns were identified and responses planned in the context of shared responsibilities for security policy and strategy between LEAs and schools.

While schools were increasingly responsible for the implementation of security measures, they and their LEAs described a **combination of experience of specific incidents and the conduction of more formal risk assessments** in order to identify their key security concerns. In addition to school staff and Governors, **other actors** playing specific roles in the identification of need and formulation of responses included:

- **Police** – in particular Crime Prevention and School Liaison Officers
- **Fire Service**
- **Local Authority staff** – including Health and Safety, Risk Management, Property Services, Capital Programming, Architects and Planning representatives.
- **Service providers** – such as insurers, equipment providers and maintenance contractors.
- **Consultants** – for example in the areas of security, insurance and risk assessment.
- **Community representatives** – to a lesser extent, but where used providing valuable inputs.

In many cases working groups had been established, led by local authority staff but commonly including Police and Fire Service representation.

Previous **evaluation and review** activities also informed the security planning process, in terms of identifying measures which were considered to be effective, identifying priority responses, and improving the planning process itself. The benefits of partnership/multi-agency approaches in identifying need and proposing responses was also emphasised, leading to closer work with recognised 'experts' and the establishment of working groups and security forums.

While the study focused on the use of CMF monies, it was apparent that LEAs and schools had used a variety of **funding sources** to support their security measures. One LEA described utilising funds from over a dozen sources to mobilise their security strategy, in addition to the commonly mentioned School Security Grant and Standards Fund monies. However, the dynamic nature of security concerns was such that on-going investment was considered essential – to

maintain and update existing measures, expand existing provision, and establish a strategic, rolling programme approach.

Effective Approaches and Practice

LEAs provided details of the measures that, in their experience, were considered to have worked well in addressing security concerns. A series of common responses were received, with **fencing**, **CCTV** (with certain caveats) and **access control systems** being described as being particularly effective. Elsewhere measures to prevent unauthorised access to buildings outside of school hours were described, as well as approaches to promoting personal safety including communication systems, personal safety alarms and improved lighting.

The importance of other 'non-capital' security measures was also stressed, including:

- **Training** – including personal safety training (such as violence and aggression management, defusing violent situations and self defence) and training in risk management.
- **School management** – with proactive management contributing to reduced number of incidents and addressing issues before they escalate.
- **Strategic approaches** – in terms of applying combinations of measures to security concerns, as well as rolling-programme approaches that identify and work to address new concerns as they arise.
- **Partnership working** – the use of internal LEA and external experts was widely considered to be beneficial. Examples were also provided where groups of schools had worked in partnership to contribute towards costly measures, such as CCTV monitoring and the use of contract security services.

Continuing Concerns and Additional Measures

The dynamic nature of school security concerns was emphasised, where LEAs described their continuing security concerns and potential measures to address them. While the additional concerns were similar in priority to the main areas described previously, **pupil behaviour issues** and their impact on school security in its widest sense were raised alongside **perimeter security** and the **role of both staff and pupils** in ensuring the safety of all persons on the school site.

In many cases, additional measures required referred to LEAs' desires to bring measures at all their schools to the best standard. Accordingly, few 'new' measures were described, although the use of **security guard services** and approaches to **securing high value items** were mentioned. The updating of alarm systems, and particularly **digital CCTV**, were 'technology driven' suggestions, although again the monitoring of CCTV on a 24 hour basis was seen as key to maximising effectiveness.

The demand for additional **training** emerged strongly, around the topic areas described previously but also including general awareness training and training for pupils. Given the increasing trend for security responsibilities to be devolved to schools, training in risk assessment was seen as particularly important.

Conclusions

The study identified the **main security concerns** of the LEAs and case study schools as the personal safety of staff, pupils; intrusion; and external vandalism, arson and burglary. It also

stressed the complex links and interconnectedness between them and potential responses, although a simple 'hierarchy' of preventative measures was proposed.

The existing role and benefits of internal LEA and external experts was stressed in **identifying security needs and planning responses**, in particular the role of the Police and Fire Service. This process, and the implementation of measures resulting from it, continues to be devolved from LEAs to individual schools.

Finally, a series of '**key success factors**' were identified for promoting the security of schools in its widest sense, as follows:

- Focussing attentions on security issues – where subsequent rounds of security funding had served to continue to focus minds on school security.
- A structured approach to considering security issues and responses – with the 'hierarchy' of measures concept providing a structure for addressing security concerns.
- Follow a 'think thief' approach – where planners should consider the premises security from the criminal's viewpoint.
- Reviewing security strategies at least annually
- Making use of experts – including Police/CPO, Architectural Liaison Officers, Local Authority experts, external consultants, insurers and contractors.
- Getting school staff and Governors to take responsibility for school security – to be able to identify, implement and own.

1 INTRODUCTION

GHK, in collaboration with IPSOS-RSL and with expert inputs from Tony Holden of the Holden McAllister Partnership and Dr Tim Pascoe of the Building Research Establishment, were commissioned by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) to undertake a study into the implementation and progress of the Capital Modernisation Fund (CMF) 2002-03. The study included the review of school security needs as perceived by their respective Local Education Authorities (LEAs), and a sample of individual schools.

1.1 Aims and Objectives

The aim of the security needs element of the study was to survey LEA perceptions of school security needs and the existence of school security policies and strategies. Key topics included: identifying school security needs from the LEA perspective; the institutional framework within which these needs are addressed (for example security management processes, policies, strategies, responsibilities and accountabilities); and the influence of previous experience and lessons in proposing responses that were considered to be effective.

This report describes the findings of the study and the security needs identified. It also examines approaches to identifying and responding to these concerns, LEAs' views on effective security measures and approaches, and the contribution that CMF monies have made towards addressing these concerns.

1.2 Study Context and Methodology

The Department for Education and Skills were awarded a grant of £10 million from the Capital Modernisation Fund (CMF) to support capital investment in school security across all 150 LEAs in England. Research into the implementation of security measures funded by CMF also offered the opportunity to examine LEA perceptions of current school security needs, and the provision of measures to address them, to inform the development of future policy and practice.

The study methodology featured a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, and was undertaken between December 2002 and March 2003. Key features included:

- **A postal survey of all LEAs** – all 150 LEAs received a postal questionnaire which included a series of questions on security needs and concerns, including: what they considered their main security concerns to be; the existence of security policies and strategies, and responsibility for them, at school and LEA level; the process by which security needs are identified and addressed; measures that are considered to be particularly effective; and any outstanding issues and potential measures to address them. A total of 92 responses were received, a response rate of 61%, which were considered broadly representative in terms of LEA type (unitary, London, metropolitan and shire) and urban and rural catchments.
- **Qualitative LEA case studies** – to examine CMF implementation issues and probe security needs and responses in more detail, case studies took place in five LEA areas. The individual case study LEAs were proposed by the study steering group, and sought to give a broad representation by size (in terms of the number of schools) and geographical region. The case study fieldwork included interviews with individuals responsible for implementation and wider security matters, and visits to between two and three schools per area. The key characteristics of each LEA are summarised in Table 1.1 below.

| Table 1.1: Summary Characteristics of the Case Study LEAs | | | |
|--|------------------------|---|-----------------|
| Case Study | Schools in LEA* | Schools Visited in Case Studies | LEA type |
| 1 | 110 | 3 – all secondary, one a facility for children with educational/ behavioural difficulties | Unitary |
| 2 | 170 | 2 – both primary | Shire |
| 3 | 210 | 2 – both primary | Metropolitan |
| 4 | 90 | 2 – 1 primary and 1 secondary | London |
| 5 | 460 | 2 – both secondary | Metropolitan |

* Rounded up to nearest 10

One consideration for the interpretation of the findings of the study is that it was undertaken within the context of the CMF programme, and so respondents' thoughts may have focussed on capital approaches and measures as well as 'external' rather than 'internal' school security issues. This may have influenced some of the findings described in later chapters.

1.3 Structure of the Report

The report is structured as follows:

- Chapter 2 – describes the school security needs identified by the LEAs and case study schools during the study.
- Chapter 3 – provides an insight into approaches to identifying school security needs, and the planning of appropriate responses.
- Chapter 4 – describes a series of measures and approaches which, in the view of the LEAs and schools, were effective in promoting school security.
- Chapter 5 – describes the continued security concerns, and measures to address them, expressed by the LEAs and schools.
- Chapter 6 – sets out the main conclusions of the study.

Appendix I features a copy of the postal questionnaire distributed to the LEAs, and the checklists used in the case study interviews.

2 SCHOOL SECURITY CONCERNS

2.1 Introduction

The postal survey for the study included a series of questions on what were considered to be the most pressing current school security concerns. LEAs were asked to rank their concerns from major to minor against a series of options, with the opportunity to add extra concerns if relevant. While respondents tended to rank most concerns on the 'major' side of the notional mid-point value, it was clear that some were considered more major than others – notably issues of pupil and staff safety as described below.

The individual LEA case studies, and visits to schools, allowed security concerns to be discussed in greater detail and the links between incident type and preventative measure probed.

2.2 LEA Level – Postal Survey Responses

The postal survey asked each LEA to rank their school security concerns on a five point scale, where 5 represented a major concern and 1 a minor concern, against a set of options. They were also allowed to include additional concerns, again with a 5 to 1 ranking.


The following school security issues were included:

- Personal safety of staff and visitors to the school
- Personal safety of pupils
- Burglary/theft – on either internal or external basis
- Arson – on either an internal or external basis
- Vandalism and criminal damage – on either an internal or external basis
- Intrusion
- Car crime
- Other.

Figure 2.1 below charts the average rankings for each security concern from the 93 postal responses, and shows **the personal safety of staff, visitors and pupils to be the greatest concerns**. This finding is emphasised in terms of the numbers of LEAs ranking personal safety concerns as 5, i.e. major concerns. Only two LEAs ranked personal safety issues as minor concerns (i.e. 1 or 2), which was difficult to explain based on postal responses alone. However, both LEAs described an emphasis on access control in measures recently implemented, suggesting that attentions had focussed on preventing intrusion during the school day and so potentially reducing personal safety concerns. This and other approaches supporting staff, visitor and pupil safety are discussed in Chapter 4 in terms of effective approaches and practice.

Figure 2.1 illustrates a tendency for concerns to be grouped in terms of average rankings, with personal safety issues being followed by **intrusion and external vandalism**, then **external arson** before a grouping of **external burglary/theft, internal vandalism and internal arson** followed by **internal burglary/theft**.

Figure 2.1: Ranking of Security Concerns



Conversely, **only car crime fell beyond the mid-point between major and minor concerns**, with an average ranking of 2.55, and just three LEAs ranking it as a major concern (ranked 5). However, the definition assumed by the LEAs regarding car crime may be an influencing factor in the ranking allocated to it. For example, in two of the three cases where car crime was ranked 5, reference was made to the driving or dumping and burning of stolen vehicles on school premises (one was a case study LEA and is described further below). Elsewhere, however, it is possible that damage to teachers' or visitors' vehicles while parked on school premises has been grouped under vandalism/criminal damage – arguably a more accurate and relevant definition.

There was **little difference between the average ranking of security concerns by LEA type**, namely Metropolitan, Unitary, London and the Shires. While the Metropolitan authorities tended to rank their security concerns most highly, the difference between highest and lowest average rankings was less than 1 for all concerns with the exception of car crime. Here the Metropolitan authorities rated car crime highest at 3.1, and the Shire counties lowest at 1.9.

One trend apparent from the average rankings is the **difference in the level of concern between 'external' and 'internal' security needs** – although these definitions are simplistic and not mutually exclusive. 'Internal' concerns relate to security issues originating within the school, namely acts of vandalism, arson and burglary/theft undertaken by school pupils, while on school premises and during school time, against the property of staff, visitors to the school, or other pupils. 'External' concerns, on the other hand, originate outside the school, will follow an act of intrusion (or at least uncontrolled access to school premises during the school day), and are less likely to be undertaken by pupils.

In each case, the **'external' issues were ranked as greater concerns than the 'internal'**, and as Figure 2.1 shows 'external' vandalism, arson and burglary were ranked as greater concerns than their 'internal' counterparts, both singly and as a group. In showing 'internal' incidents as less of a concern for the LEAs, the high ranking of intrusion is explained as a necessary precursor to acts of theft, vandalism and arson, and provides an insight into the often complex linkage between identified security need and the most appropriate preventative responses.

While the majority of respondents confined their concerns to the variables offered on the questionnaire, **13 LEAs proposed other concerns, eight of which were ranked as major**. In the most part these related to the expansion of existing security measures, for example:

- Extending perimeter security measures to reduce the risk of intrusion to school sites in all schools across the LEA.
- Ensuring all schools had adequate access control systems to reduce the risk intrusion into school buildings during the school day.

In addition to extending the coverage of measures to reduce different risks across more schools in the LEAs, the behaviour of pupils and its management was also mentioned as a concern by two LEAs. These and other ongoing concerns are examined in Chapter 5.

2.3 Security Concerns – LEA and School Case Studies

The case studies allowed the security concerns described in the postal survey responses to be examined in greater detail, as well as providing insights into the concerns of individual schools in the sample visited.

2.3.1 LEA Concerns

While the views of the LEAs visited did not always exactly tally with the rankings of security concern described in the postal responses, the focus on staff, visitor and pupil safety continued to be emphasised strongly.

The key concerns expressed by each case study LEA are summarised in Box 2.1 below. It is interesting to note that the comparative scale of concerns identified in the interviews does not always match those identified on the appropriate postal survey response, and in some cases varied between interviewee at the LEA level.

Box 2.1: Security Concerns in Case Study LEAs

The case study LEAs described their current key security concerns as follows:

LEA 1 – staff and pupil safety, in particular the verbal or violent abuse of school staff (by intruders onto school premises, such as parents and youths with former associations with the school), was stated as the key security concern for the LEA. ‘External’ vandalism, caused by outsiders or out of school hours, was also a concern. The LEA described raising staff and pupil awareness of people ‘wandering around’ on school premises and within school buildings, for whatever reasons, as an area they would be focusing on in the future. Although different schools faced slightly different issues across the area, they were considered to be facing a common series of issues with no great concentrations of concern.

LEA 2 - the focus of security needs within the LEA was described as shifting over recent years away from securing buildings to maintaining the security of school sites. The case study interviews identified unauthorised incursions onto school property, by members of the public and pupils from other schools, as the main current security concern. This was based on an increase in such incidents over the previous three years, although the main impact of these incursions was described as acts of minor vandalism (such as broken windows) rather than physical safety issues due to their occurrence after school hours.

LEA 3 - school security was a major concern for the LEA, who described the links between changes in the social culture of the city and changing security needs (including increased unemployment and poverty, inter-racial tensions, reduced out of hours activities for school children, and over-population and overcrowding). Key current concerns, each of which have escalated in frequency and gravity over recent years, include:

- Physical safety/violence – in terms of threats to staff and pupils while on school property, but also the impact of racist and domestic violence, which affect both academic success and the pressures put on teachers by pupils who confide in them rather than in the police.
- Intrusion – climbing onto school roofs was described as ‘a *pastime*’ for many teenage boys. The difficulties between finding a balance between an open-door policy and preventing unauthorised access were described as a continuing dilemma.
- Vandalism – considered to be fuelled by drug and alcohol abuse, and prostitution (which was known to be taking place on school property during the school day).
- Car crime – in terms of vandalism to staff and visitor cars parked on-site, as well as stolen vehicles being driven onto school property, see Box 2.2 below.

LEA 4 - staff and pupil safety (from strangers/intruders entering school premises), intrusion, external theft, vandalism (after school hours) and arson were all rated as serious/major concerns. Within the LEA a slight variation in security needs and their gravity was identified between schools, with more concerns in the south of the area than the north. Little change in the nature of concerns was reported over the last 3 years.

LEA 5 – the influence of recent high profile incidents on perceptions of security needs was evidenced by references to gun crime, in addition to staff and pupil safety, as the authority’s main security concern. Vandalism and external theft (particularly of ICT equipment) were also concerns. As a large authority, LEA 5 covered both inner city and suburban areas, with schools in the inner city suffering from incidents on a more frequent basis. For example, anecdotal comment showed that incident rates across the authority average two incidents per school per year, whereas one inner city school had a rolling average rate of 28.

As described above, while the majority of LEAs described car crime as a minor concern, **one case study ranked car crime as a major concern** on the basis of the incidents described in Box 2.2 below.

Box 2.2: Examples of Vehicle Crime as Major Concern – LEA 3

Car crime was described as a major concern for LEA 3, through the driving and dumping of motor vehicles on school premises. Two specific incidents were described, although the dumping of stolen vehicles on school premises was commonplace:

- In one school a stolen car was driven across a playing field during a PE lesson, injuring a number of pupils. Fortunately the injuries caused were slight, although this was more by good fortune than design.
- Another incident occurred after school hours, where a stolen car was repeatedly rammed into metal shutters protecting a new gym built on a second school site. Although the shutters prevented entry, the incident still caused considerable damage, disruption and incurred cost as the car had to be removed and the damaged shutters replaced.

As incidents of stolen cars being dumped and increasingly burnt out on school premises have increased, the LEA have considered appropriate responses, including building moats and installing bollards as a means of preventing further incidents.

2.3.2 School Concerns

The case studies also allowed security concerns at the individual school level to be examined, although clearly with a small sample of establishments compared to the total in each LEA. It was apparent from some of the case studies that security-incidents were not always reported to the LEA, with one area (LEA 3) describing how their schools tended to deal with incidents where no significant costs were incurred independently, although a system to log incidents in a standard format was being introduced as part of wider strategic developments in the area.

Nevertheless, **considerable resonance emerged around the key security concerns expressed at the both the LEA and school levels**, even if only communicated between the two on an anecdotal basis. Clearly the examination of concerns at school level would be expected to show some differences given the disaggregation from overall LEA level. Examples of current security concerns described by the schools in the case study areas are described in Box 2.3 below.

Box 2.3: Key Security Concerns at the School Level – Case Study LEAs

Examples of the key security concerns described by schools visited as part of the LEA case studies are provided below.

LEA 1 – the three schools visited in this LEA described different main security concerns:

- School 1 identified few security concerns, with their main concern being out of hours intrusion and subsequent acts of vandalism - describing breaches of perimeter security as common but entry to internal buildings as rare and less of an issue.
- School 2 was a school for children with educational and behavioural difficulties, set in an area of comparatively high crime. They described car crime as their main concern - the school backs onto open fields and woodland with incomplete perimeter fencing, allowing both the dumping of cars on school premises and young people to ride motorcycles onto school premises during the school day to impress younger siblings and peers.
- School 3 described staff security and physical access to the site (leading to car crime) as their main concerns. A large school set out in a star pattern with all pupils passing through a central atrium, its layout and over 20 points of entry causes a range of problems for intrusion prevention and visitor management. One key intrusion/access issue was the dumping and burning of stolen cars alongside the school kitchens, in close proximity to gas storage units.

LEA 2 – here the schools visited drew the links between actual and perceived security concerns and pupils' academic success, and described their key concerns as unauthorised incursion (both during and after school hours) and vandalism. An additional local complication for one school is the presence of a psychiatric hospital nearby, and patients have been known to wander unaccompanied around the area. The threat of potential incursion, and to pupil safety (perceived and actual), was emphasised during the summer of 2002, when pupils found a patient unconscious under a school hedge.

LEA 3 – given the level of concern at the LEA level, the schools visited described security as a major issue in terms of the level and nature of incidents, and in one case describing an OFSTED report citing the lack of security at the school.

- One school described their prime concern being pupil security during play and lunchtime (through intrusion, though high people-throughputs for work experience etc was described as making adherence to their limited access control measures difficult), but that small-scale arson (such as dustbin lids damaging playground tarmac), and external burglaries were also a problem. Vandalism was a particular problem at weekends and during the summer holidays, when the school is not used, and mainly focused on breaking windows.

- The second school had recently benefited from considerable investment to improve an identified security deficiency, although considerable weaknesses and concerns were still recognised. The school's key concern is vandalism, carried out by a transient group of young people congregating on the site. While reduced significantly during recent building works (with security guards being employed following theft and damage to equipment after school hours), incidents of vandalism and window-breaking are increasing again following the completion of building works and the removal of active security cover. The young people using the site pose an additional risk for pupils and staff, as they are believed to be responsible for the used needles and associated drug paraphernalia increasingly found on school premises.

The case study fieldwork with individual schools also allowed discussions on their **responses to their identified security concerns**. While a range of responses and their effectiveness are described in Chapter 4, examples of responses to the concerns described above appear in Box 2.4.

Box 2.4: Responses to Security Concerns – Case Study Schools

LEA 1 – each of the schools visited described measures introduced to address their security concerns, as follows:

- School 1 described that although out of hours vandalism remained a problem, incidents had declined considerably over recent years. This was felt to be due to the installation of a CCTV system, which was believed to have contributed significantly to reducing incidents of vandalism, and a reduction in the cost of repairing broken windows from £6-8,000 per year to the current £1-2,000.
- School 2 described how incidents of burglary have decreased over previous years following the introduction of security grills and a zoning approach, featuring secure areas for the storage of high value items such as IT. However, concerns were raised about the displacement effect of their measures, with the identification of a group of 'local offenders' who target different schools at different times and may have moved on to 'softer' targets.
- School 3 described car crime, and in particular the burning of stolen cars alongside their buildings, as one of their main security concerns. In response the school erected a series of moveable barriers, which allowed continued access to their community facilities while preventing cars reaching the school buildings.

In **LEA2** one school reported the presence of a nearby psychiatric hospital as an issue, which raised their concerns over unauthorised intrusion. Consequently anti-intrusion measures were prioritised, including the installation of a perimeter fence and the use of a private security company to patrol their grounds.

2.4 Summary

The postal survey and case study fieldwork identified and provided further detail on a range of security issues for schools, with **staff, visitor and pupil safety emerging as clear and common priority concerns**. Intrusion and external vandalism, arson and burglary/theft were also issues of considerable concern. Only car crime appeared, at the overall level, to be less of an issue across the LEAs. However, although this may be due to the interpretation of vehicle damage as vandalism, and the examples provided above illustrated how car crime can be a major issue and have considerable consequences in terms of disruption, damage and pupil safety.

In describing the key security concerns, it became apparent that a **significant degree of linkage and inter-connection** exists between them. For example, 'external' concerns, such as incidents of vandalism but in particular burglary and arson, are unlikely to occur without unauthorised intrusion onto school premises. Other risks, such as the personal safety of staff, pupils and

visitors to the school, will be more likely to require unauthorised, or at least unsupervised, access to school buildings during the school day.

To counter these concerns, a simple **'hierarchy' of preventative measures** can be identified, which works in a 'top down' and 'bottom up' manner depending on the 'internal' or 'external' nature of the particular risk. While this simplistic view masks the more complex web of relationships in practice, one can see a hierarchy of measures as follows:

- Secure school perimeters – through perimeter fencing to reduce intrusion to school grounds.
- Controlling the layout and permeability of schools – through access control and visitor management measures, to reduce unauthorised access to school buildings, the risk of vandalism and theft, and threats to the physical safety of staff and pupils.
- Measures implemented within school buildings – through measures including physical 'barriers' (fencing, zoning approaches, window grills and other steps to prevent unauthorised access), and other potentially 'reactive' or 'off-putting' measures (such as alarm systems, CCTV and property marking) to prevent vandalism and theft. They can also include personal safety alarms and communication systems in remote classrooms to further reduce the risk to staff and pupil safety.

This interconnection between security concerns is a key factor in developing an understanding of how security needs are identified and prioritised, and how suitable responses are formulated. It is also clear that these responses must consider a wider range of factors, in addition to resources, including:

- Balancing the positions of schools as welcoming places of learning and encouraging open access, with the reduction of risk of all types.
- Considering the views of local residents and the wider community – such as aesthetic issues around physical measures and considering informal 'rights of way' across school premises, against the reduction of risk and distress to the residents of properties bordering the schools.
- The likelihood of displacement – while less of a concern for the individual school implementing a security measure, LEAs must consider whether preventative approaches simply move the 'problem' to another local school, or even away from schools into the commercial or residential property sectors.
- The exclusion or inclusion of community needs - e.g. use of facilities out of school hours leading to ownership, guardianship etc.

The following Chapter identifies the processes by which security needs are identified and prioritised, and appropriate responses proposed.

3 IDENTIFYING NEED AND PLANNING RESPONSES

3.1 Introduction

This Chapter summarises approaches to identifying security needs and planning appropriate responses, including the key actors and their respective responsibilities, the strategic context and examples of the processes followed at the LEA and school levels. It draws on the wider findings of the postal survey, as well as specific examples from the case studies that allow a clearer picture of the often complex relationships between policies, strategies and implementation to be described.

3.2 Responsibility for School Security – LEA Policy and Strategy

The long-term trend towards the devolution of responsibility for school security to individual schools is continuing, with a **two-tier policy approach** being most commonly identified, with LEAs and schools having their own policies and strategies/ implementation plans. However, the detail of the balance between different policy frames is often complicated, as the postal survey identified.

Of the LEAs responding to the specific question in the postal questionnaire, 62 described having a specific school security policy, while 26 did not. Where LEAs had school security policies, they were most commonly reviewed on an annual basis, with review periods varying from 'as and when' to every five years. Reviews did not always lead to policies being updated. While the majority of LEAs described amending policies in parallel with the review cycle, some had not been updated for over five years (for LEAs describing annual reviews) and as long ago as 1996 (where review took place on an 'as required' basis).

While 68 of the LEAs described having a school security strategy, somewhat paradoxically this is more than described the existence of a security policy, although semantics may play a role here. Further analysis showed that of the 86 LEAs responding to the questions:

- 51 described having both a school security policy and strategy
- 8 described having a policy only
- 13 described having a strategy only
- 14 described having neither.


While there were some cases of confusion on the part of the respondents in terms of the existence of LEA security policies and strategies (potentially due to respondents' being responsible for the implementation of CMF alone and disconnected with wider policy and strategic frameworks), links between the school security planning process and wider Asset Management, Health and Safety and Capital Programming strategies were apparent.

The importance of links with, and the influence of, **Asset Management Plans** (AMPs) in supporting school security measures was emphasised by a number of LEAs. In many cases school security issues, and strategies and priorities to address them, feature in AMPs in many LEAs. This will be an increasingly important issue as AMPs become the main conduit for school security funding.

In common with the earlier findings on key security concerns, the **key drivers** of the individual LEA strategies were described as staff and pupil security, the seriousness and level of the incidents occurring, and risk management issues. Again a ranking was used, on a 1 to 5 scale, with 5 being the most important and 1 the least.

Figure 3.1 shows the average rankings for the different strategic drivers. Interestingly, none received average rankings below the notional mid-point of 3 – suggesting that each of the factors were considered important, but some more so than others. As with the ranking of security concerns, few differences emerged between the average ranking of drivers between Metropolitan, Unitary, London Boroughs and the Shire counties, and no rankings varied by more than one point.

Figure 3.1: Drivers of School Security Strategy



Only two LEAs described 'other' drivers of their school security strategies:

...d new building/extension work, which was ranked 4.

- One specifically described the risk of arson as a key driver, with a ranking of 5.

3.3 Responsibilities at the School Level

The devolution of responsibility for security to schools was reflected in the fact that two thirds of the LEAs responding (58 out of 87) described the requirement for schools in their areas to have their own school security policies – irrespective of whether or not strategies existed at the LEA level.

While the LEAs were not always able to comment on the detail of their schools' policies, over half described the schools as being responsible for the monitoring of policies (29 of the 52 responses). Almost one in four described monitoring as a shared responsibility between the schools and their LEAs.

3.4 Identifying Concerns and Developing Responses

In the majority of cases, the identification of school security concerns evolved in a combination of **experience of specific incidents and the undertaking of more formal risk assessments**.

3.4.1 Key actors

In addition to school staff, Governors and pupils, the involvement of the **Police** in the planning of responses to identified security issues was widespread, described by 87 of the 93 LEAs and with Crime Prevention and School Liaison Officers being common links. The **Fire Service** were also consulted widely, with 62 LEAs describing using their expertise and experience, in 61 cases alongside that of the Police.

A range of other organisations also play a role in security planning, including:

- **Local Authority staff** – from across Departments depending on different LEA structures, but including: Health and Safety, Risk Management, Insurance, Property Services, Capital Programming, Building Maintenance, Architects and Planning team representatives. A number of working groups had also been formed, commonly including a range of Local Authority representatives, the Police and Fire Service, Headteachers and insurance or security specialists.
- **Service providers** – in a number of cases insurance companies and contractors had been consulted on security concerns, with insurance companies increasingly providing consultancy and advisory services on school security issues.
- **Consultants** – six LEAs described using consultancy services to help address security concerns, including: risk management, insurance, and security consultants.
- **Community representatives** – although infrequently mentioned, one LEA suggested that community involvement was particularly useful.

3.4.2 The Influence of Evaluation

Where LEAs had evaluated the effectiveness of school security measures, funded under the former DfEE School Security Grant, a number found their findings both illuminating and instructive. While the standard of evaluation varied considerably, data were sometimes provided which suggested positive change in incident numbers, although issues of attribution remain outstanding.

In a number of cases, the evaluations were reported as confirming that the **security measures** implemented were having an impact, and that some, such as fencing, access control, lighting and CCTV, appeared to be particularly effective. Here the 'proven' or promising approaches were promoted by the LEA, as well as informing strategy and becoming potential **strategic priorities**.

Other influences on **security strategies** included improvements to strategic planning approaches, following the recommendations of earlier evaluations. In one case, the LEA considered that a more informed strategy had resulted from getting schools to think more pro-actively about security, and supporting them in the development of security strategies and action plans. In another LEA a series of seminars were held for Headteachers, staff and Governors, and involved the Police, Fire Service and their insurance company. The aim was to raise awareness but led to a series of developments, including: incident and insurance data being collected and analysed to assess the effectiveness of security spending, Risk Management Groups being established, and baselines set in terms of incident levels and responsive capability.

Elsewhere where the findings (and implementation experiences) stressed the benefit of close **partnership working**, a number of LEAs described introducing changes to the way they work jointly to address security concerns. Closer working with the Police (and the establishment of protocols for incident reporting), Insurers, Risk Managers and other professionals (as well as local Crime Reduction Partnerships) was commonly reported, sometimes leading to the formation of working groups or the establishment of timetabled meetings.

3.4.3 Funding School Security

The study provided insights into the range of potential funding sources to support school security measures, although this was in the context of the use of CMF monies. While one LEA described using over a dozen funding sources to support the provision of security measures in their schools, a series of potential sources were frequently mentioned in the postal survey. These included:

- Most commonly, schools' own funding sources – from mainstream budgets and funding raised by other means.
- The former School Security Grant, Standards Fund and the Schools Renewal Challenge Fund.
- Other central LEA funding – including devolved capital funds, resources to implement Asset Management Plans, funding from Risk Management groups, and local and parish council contributions.
- New Deal for Schools, Single Regeneration Budget and other competitive funding approaches.
- Private sector – including in one case the provision of a CCTV system to a school by a leading supermarket chain, and the involvement of a housing trust in supporting the introduction of CMF measures.

However, LEAs saw the process of identifying and responding to security concerns as a dynamic one, which required on-going investment to maintain as well as expand existing provision. To this end the requirement for additional funding was reported widely, as both an absolute and as a rolling-programme with annual allocations to support the development and continuation of more strategic approaches.

4 EFFECTIVE APPROACHES AND PRACTICE

This chapter provides a review of the security measures which, in the view of the LEAs and the case study schools, have been effective in promoting the security of their property, pupils and staff. It also examines, primarily from the case studies but also including responses from the postal survey, approaches to school security management which have also worked well locally.

4.1 Which Measures Work Well

Each LEA was asked to list the security measures that, in their experience, were considered to have worked particularly well and may represent examples of effective practice. A total of 81 of the 93 postal respondents offered comments, and unsurprisingly a series of common measures emerged which correspond to recognised and 'proven' approaches, as summarised in Table 4.1 below.

| Measure | Comment |
|----------------|---|
| Fencing | <p>The most common response, with over half the respondents describing it as the most effective means of reducing intrusion and subsequent acts of vandalism, theft and arson. Effectiveness is conditional, however, on the quality of fencing (for example, weldmesh over links), its height (2.4m seems most common) and position. While it can be costly, a number of LEAs described inner-ring fencing as being effective if complete outer perimeter coverage is prohibitively costly.</p> <p>The benefits of fencing were widely cited and contextual, with one LEA describing a 75% reduction in crime and trespass resulting from the installation of perimeter fencing, and others significant savings in damage costs and disruption. Also examples of fencing making schools safer for pupils in school hours by reducing risk of injury from discarded bottles, syringes etc, as well as improving staff and pupil morale.</p> <p>In addition, the clear delineation of school property was also reported to have a positive effect, although not against the most purposive of intruders.</p> |
| CCTV | <p>Widely considered to be an effective security measure, although issues were described around monitoring and maintenance /update costs. Commonly used on main buildings and isolated sites, an emerging trend towards digital technology identified – for cameras (increased clarity, colour picture) and recording equipment.</p> <p>A range of benefits were described, from preventative effects (intrusion, theft, vandalism etc) to reduced intimidation and harassment of visitors and staff, and an increased sense of well being. A series of key success factors for CCTV were described, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cameras must produce pictures of sufficient quality for individuals to be recognised – this can include provision of extra lighting. ▪ Monitoring links are essential for full benefit – either at school or centrally, with a number of examples of centralised approaches to monitoring covering multiple local schools being described. ▪ Need for non-teaching staff to operate and monitor the system. ▪ Must be well maintained. ▪ Works best in medium-risk areas – in high-risk areas not seen as a deterrent. <p>CCTV was often used in combination approaches – for example as a cost effective addition to access control systems via door security, and with improved lighting to reduce vandalism.</p> |

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>Access Control Systems</p> | <p>Access control systems, commonly comprising a combination of individual elements, were also frequently described as having been successful, most notably in terms of reduced unauthorised access during the school day, walk in theft, and improved (actual and perceived) pupil, staff and visitor safety and security (and reassurance for parents).</p> <p>Following previous DfES guidance, many LEAs described having single secure entrance lobbies combined with preventing access from all other entrances during school hours. Different elements used in combination include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Visitor management approaches – including visitor logging/signing in, badging and routine approaches to directing visitors and ‘hosting’ once on school premises. ▪ Improved signage – to provide guidance to access points, aid pupil and visitor circulation, and set clearly defined boundaries. ▪ Door security/entry systems – included automated and self-closing doors, intercom systems, and monitoring through CCTV at entry points. ▪ Reception point at lobby – to restrict unchallenged access and direct visitors. |
| <p>Preventing Unauthorised Access to Buildings Outside School Hours</p> | <p>While access control systems were considered effective at preventing unauthorised intrusion to school buildings during school hours, more traditional measures were found to be effective at preventing intrusion out of hours:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Intruder alarm systems - monitored alarm systems were considered essential by many respondents, as an alert and to help ensure intruders are detected before they have the opportunity to vandalise or set fire to school buildings. ▪ Security shutters/grills - protecting buildings from intrusion and criminal damage, theft and arson. Roller shutters were considered effective, while window/door security shutters have proved a cost effective solution for particularly heavily vandalised parts of buildings. ▪ Anti-climbing devices – to reduce intrusion but also damage through vandalism. Can include anti-climb paint, roller spikes, and anti-climbing ‘cacti’. <p>In the case of entry to a school building, property marking systems, and in particular Smartwater security marking, was described as being a useful measure. A number of LEAs also suggested that the best security measure is school occupation, with activities using school buildings outside school hours being a useful deterrent. The use of the school as a community facility also helped engagement with neighbours, who could also play a role in the wider security of the school. However, both cases require schools to think strategically about the supervision of visitors out of school hours and the most practical approach to routing to ensure both their, and the school’s, safety and security.</p> |
| <p>Promoting Personal Safety</p> | <p>While measures to prevent unauthorised access to school premises, and controlled entry to buildings, contributed to promoting the safety of staff, pupils and visitors, a series of more specific personal measures were also considered effective. These included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Communications systems – the extension of telephone systems, or provision of two-way radios, to remote buildings has worked well and provides links between detached facilities and the main school building. The use of radios during break time and on school visits is also considered beneficial. ▪ Safety alarm systems – the use of personal safety alarms for teachers was considered effective in reducing the fear of incidents, as well as providing ‘stranger danger’ alerts. One LEA described how the installation of a silent panic alarm in a facility for pupils with educational and behavioural difficulties reduced the level and number of incidents to staff and damage to property. ▪ Lighting – while improved lighting contributed to CCTV and other measures, it could in itself lead to improved staff safety by removing places for intruders to hide. In addition, good lighting also reduces safety concerns by providing well-lit walking areas for staff entering or leaving in darkness. <p>Given the scale of concern surrounding staff, pupil and visitor personal safety, it was surprising that personal safety training was rarely mentioned as a security measure throughout the study. The six LEAs reporting it as an effective measure, however, described a range of approaches, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Violence and aggression training – provided to all schools ▪ Personal safety training for staff needing to respond to CCTV incidents ▪ Training in defusing angry and violent situations, and handling verbal abuse ▪ Violence and self defence training provided by the Metropolitan Police |

4.2 Management and Strategy

In addition to the different measures proposed as effective by the individual LEAs, wider issues of management and strategy were identified as key elements in effective approaches to school security.

Firstly, however, the importance of the **design of school premises**, in terms of designing-out hot spots in capital project works, was stressed as a means of reducing problems before they start. The avoidance of low climbable roofs and entries, removal of aids to entry, and blocking off alcoves and porches to reduce potential hiding/gathering places were all suggestions for designing security in from the outset. While these principles are widely recognised, they are still worth consideration as part of minor works to schools, rather than just in the case of large developments.

The benefits of **strategic approaches** were also well recognised, and commented on earlier in the report, although here a 'strategic' approach to the combination of measures on a single site was frequently stressed. More widely, however, it was considered that **school management** can have the greatest effect on security. Where good and proactive management are the norm fewer security incidents occur, and those that do are reacted to rapidly and appropriately to ensure they do not escalate. The encouragement of a culture of mutual respect, trust and responsibility for school property, other pupils and staff can also have positive security benefits.

The importance of **partnership** to addressing school security concerns, and the benefits of partnership approaches were emphasised in the postal survey and case studies. Chapter 3 described the high levels of involvement of the Police, Fire Service and other professionals in suggesting responses to security issues. Here the importance of collaborative activities was re-stressed, in terms of helping identify, and propose informed responses to, security issues. The establishment of school security fora, made up of a combination of LEA and external 'expert' staff, was also described as an effective vehicle for security planning and funding allocation. In addition, approaches where **schools worked in partnership** to contribute to expensive shared measures, such as 24 hour CCTV monitoring and security cover, were considered beneficial.

Finally, it is also important for schools to consider the **on-going costs** associated with the security measures they choose to implement. Once in place different measures will require different investments in maintaining their effective operation, including maintenance and repair contracts as well as the cost of updates for technology-based approaches. Even more simple measures, such as planting trees or shrubs on-site, will require pruning before they provide hiding places for intruders, or begin to obscure new lighting installed to improve visibility.

4.3 Gaps and emerging areas

While school and LEA experiences of the measures described above were positive, all were able to identify other areas of need which remained unaddressed, as well as areas of opportunity springing from new technology and promising approaches. While many of the examples of innovation were on analysis best described as 'innovative to the local area', a series of future issues and potential responses were identified, which are the focus of the next Chapter.

5 CONTINUING CONCERNS AND ADDITIONAL MEASURES

5.1 Introduction

In addition to identifying measures that were considered to work well in promoting school security, LEAs also identified areas of continued concern and potential measures which could be used to address them.

Most respondents described school security as an area of continuing concern that would require attention, and funding, on an on-going basis. While some areas described facing greater challenges than others, both in terms of the level and nature of incidents taking place and the coverage, quality and fitness for purpose of the existing measures to address them, most considered that significant investment would continue to be required before all schools in their areas could reach an acceptable common standard.

Within this context, a series of continuing concerns were described, with potential measures that could be used to address them.

5.2 Continuing Concerns

The security concerns described by the LEAs, unsurprisingly, mirrored those identified as current and allocated the highest priorities.

During school time, the personal safety of staff and pupils was a recurring issue, although pupil behaviour issues were referred to increasingly. Concerns regarding perimeter security, as well as access and visitor control, were also raised – and clearly had a role to play in ensuring the safety of all persons on the school site.

Out of school hours vandalism, theft and arson remained important issues – with the requirement for updated and ‘intelligent’ alarm systems being frequently raised. The influence of new and emerging technology was also apparent, with the use and effectiveness of CCTV-based monitoring approaches being suggested for both in- and out-of school hours security.

5.3 Additional Measures

While technology-based solutions continued to be promoted by many LEAs, the importance and effectiveness of **perimeter security measures** was stressed most commonly. This supports recent research into the behaviour of burglars, which showed that once perimeter defences are breached, increased confidence will lead potential burglars to attempt more difficult entry routes. For many LEAs, their future concerns would be allayed to a considerable extent through the extension of fit-for-purpose perimeter fencing to all the schools in their areas.

Similarly the **introduction/expansion/updating of CCTV** was a commonly referenced measure, with the points about the frequency of monitoring set out in the previous Chapter being stressed further. The improvement of image quality (allowing individuals to be clearly identified) and storage through digital technology was considered to enhance a potentially effective approach further, although costs remain an important factor in investment decisions – both capital and revenue. The more selective use of CCTV within a school was felt to be a potential solution, with portable systems offering experience to schools new to CCTV as well as allowing equipment to be re-positioned on-site to address specific needs. Given the increased reference to pupil behaviour issues, CCTV was seen as a potential contributor to behaviour management approaches.

Broad '**building security**' measures were also seen as being important, including the wider roll-out of access control, visitor management and door and window lock/grill protection. Sprinkler systems were mentioned in terms of reducing fire damage (both arson and accidental), although the costs were recognised as being prohibitively high and more suited to inclusion at the building design stage.

The potential role of **security guard services** was also referred to in schools with particularly high levels of incidents, or where a pattern of increase is identified which can be 'nipped in the bud'. Increased levels of **Police** presence and the level of response were also requested by half a dozen LEAs, although it was acknowledged that trends not to report incidents of low level crime and vandalism may not be helpful.

Outside of the common areas described above, a series of other issues and approaches were described, including:

- **Design** – with the importance of 'designing out' security risks, in line with available literature and guidance in the subject.
- **Improved data sharing** – between the schools, LEA, Police and other partners, to ensure strategies and responses are best informed.
- **The recruitment of full-time or contracted security advisers** – where the breadth of responsibilities of existing LEA staff are stretched, and responsibilities for planning and project management redistributed.
- **Securing high value items** – most commonly referring to ICT equipment, including: the introduction of smoke-cloak devices; the use of particularly secure rooms, stores and 'zones'; DNA encrypted property marking fluid, etc. One LEA wondered if it would be possible to engage with the ICT industry to find mutually beneficial approaches to ICT security and theft.

5.4 Training

An increasingly important point, given the continued devolution of security responsibilities to schools and the potential linkage with pupil behaviour management approaches, is the provision of appropriate training to school staff.

A series of training areas could be identified:

- **Awareness raising** about the importance of security and potential headline risk areas – so that all staff reached a common baseline of 'security awareness'. This could take many forms, from encouraging staff to challenge individuals found on school property (considering issues of personal safety in so doing) to thinking safe and closing and locking access points.
- **Person and anger management training** – for example how best to deal with intruders; individuals becoming angry, abusive or threatening; and pupils who are victims of assault or theft. This could usefully be combined with personal safety training.
- **Pupil training** – although this is in place in some LEAs, training for pupils in school and wider security matters.
- **Risk assessments** – training in how to undertake them, supported by improved knowledge of the range, appropriateness and effectiveness of different potential solutions.

Given the importance of security, as well as behaviour management, there is a clear rationale for the inclusion of personal safety and anger/violence management skills in teacher training. In addition, the Police, and CPO/Community Beat Officers in particular, can play a central role in the provision of security training to schools – with additional benefits of enhancing collaborative working and shared understandings.

6 CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Introduction

This final Chapter provides the conclusions of the study, pulling together the key messages from the research set out in the document.

6.2 Conclusions

6.2.1 *School Security Concerns*

The LEAs and case study schools described their main security concerns as:

- The personal safety of staff, pupils and visitors.
- Intrusion to school sites and premises.
- External vandalism and criminal damage.
- External arson.
- External burglary.

A clear difference in the levels of concern expressed between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ concerns was identified - with external concerns originating outside the school and following initial unauthorised access/intrusion to school premises being rated as more of a problem than internal concerns.

The case study LEAs and schools reflected these concerns although, at the level of the individual schools, different rankings of concerns were identified.

One interesting finding was the linkage and apparent ‘hierarchy’ of concerns, which may be of relevance in conceptualising the relationship between concerns and potentially relevant responses. While links between perimeter fencing and the prevention of a range of incident types can be drawn, other measures, such as access control during school hours and personal safety alarms, were more focussed on specific incidents and concerns.

However, the ‘hierarchy’ model risks over-simplifying what are complex and interconnected issues that may require equally complicated and multi-faceted solutions. In addition, the study identified that other factors also play a key role in addressing security concerns – including the management of schools in general and school security systems specifically, and the recognition of the need to manage resources to ensure security measures can be adequately monitored and maintained. Finally, the importance of responding rapidly and appropriately to security incidents was stressed to ensure that incidents do not escalate and present further risk to people and property.

6.2.2 *Identifying Need and Planning Responses*

The role of LEA specialists (including insurance, planning, Health and Safety, capital programme and building maintenance experts), in combination with external agencies such as the Police, Fire Service, insurers/private contractors and security consultants, was stressed in identifying and addressing school security needs.

Importantly, the increasing devolution of responsibility for school security from LEAs to schools was identified, with responsibilities for policy and strategy often being held at two levels. While not

easy to be precise, it appeared that the frequency of review of both needs and responses might take place less frequently than would be expected, with a recommendation that reviews should take place on an annual basis.

Funding issues were also described, in terms of the continued need for funding to support development and renewal, but also for a consistent programme which allowed more strategic approaches to be followed. While the CMF was welcomed as bringing resources to the security issue, its small scale and one-off nature was acknowledged as hindering its strategic significance.

6.2.3 Effective Approaches

A series of approaches considered to be effective by the LEAs and case study schools were described. Fencing and CCTV were the most frequently mentioned, along with proviso's to ensure their use is as effective as possible.

The 'hierarchy' of measures against concerns described earlier was reflected here, as well as elements of management, design, partnership/collaborative working and considering revenue as well as capital costs.

Continued concern, and potential solutions were also discussed. Here perimeter security and CCTV continued to be measures in demand, although the need for staff training was stressed by a few LEAs. Training covered a range of areas, from undertaking risk assessments (increasingly important given enhanced school responsibilities) to personal safety and anger management training.

Interestingly, only a small share of LEAs described links between security concerns and behaviour management issues for pupils. This is an area of obvious overlap, with developments in the behaviour management area needing to be considered alongside more 'traditional' security concerns.

6.3 Key Success Factors

A series of practical tips were described for consideration in the implementation of the security measures, although a wider set of success factors were identified. These included:

- Focussing attentions on security issues – where subsequent rounds of security funding had served to continue to focus minds on school security.
- A structured approach to considering security issues and responses – with the 'hierarchy' of measures concept providing a structure for addressing security concerns.
- Follow a 'think thief' approach – where planners should consider the premises security from the criminal's viewpoint.
- Reviewing security strategies at least annually
- Making use of experts – including Police/CPO, Architectural Liaison Officers, Local Authority experts, external consultants, insurers and contractors.
- Getting school staff and Governors to take responsibility for school security – to be able to identify, implement and own.

6.4 Additional Sources of Information

Finally, a range of documentary and web-based guidance is available for LEAs and schools on the topic of school security. The websites sites listed are considered the most relevant, and contain links to other sites:

www.dfes.gov.uk/schoolsecurity/

<http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/>

<http://www.met.police.uk/crimeprevention/garden>

<http://www.arsonpreventionbureau.org.uk>

The Department for Education and Skills (DfES) has produced a video on security in schools, entitled "Can You See What They See?", which is available via the DfES website above.

ANNEX I

**POSTAL QUESTIONNAIRE AND CASE STUDY INTERVIEW
CHECKLISTS**

POSTAL QUESTIONNAIRE

1 CMF SCHOOL SECURITY PROJECTS

A Introduction

A1 Please confirm the LEA's CMF School Security allocation

| |
|---|
| £ |
|---|

A2 How has the CMF money been allocated by the LEA? For example has the LEA allocated according to previous risk assessment or asked schools to bid for funding? Please summarise in the box below.

| |
|--|
| |
|--|

A3 How many schools in the LEA area received grants/measures under CMF?

| |
|--|
| |
|--|

A4 Who is responsible for implementing the individual CMF measures in schools in the LEA area? Please tick as relevant:

- The LEA
- The schools

A5 Please complete the table below, to summarise the type of CMF-funded school security measures across the LEA, and the number of schools benefiting from each measure.

| School Security Measure | No of schools |
|--|---------------|
| Alarm systems – e.g. intruder or fire alarms, personal alarms/panic buttons | |
| Car park security | |
| CCTV | |
| Communication equipment - e.g. telephones in classrooms/remote or mobile sites | |
| Entry/access control systems – e.g. electronic gates/access systems, improved security at school entrances, door locks and window security | |

Table continued overleaf

| School Security Measure | No of schools |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|
| Fencing – e.g. perimeter fencing | |
| Footpaths and visitor routing systems | |
| Improved signage | |
| Security lighting | |
| <u>Other-Please specify</u> | |

A6 Does the LEA consider any of the measures funded under CMF to be particularly innovative? If yes, please, describe which measure and what is innovative about it below.

B Overall Aims and Objectives

B1 What are the LEA's objectives for the use of CMF funding – what are they trying to achieve? Please tick all that apply

| | |
|--|--------------------------|
| Enhance staff and pupil security | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Reduce incidents of arson | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Reduce incidents of vandalism and criminal damage | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Reduce incidents of intrusion onto school premises | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Reduce the value of criminal incidents | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Reduce incidents of theft from school premises | <input type="checkbox"/> |

| |
|-------------------------------------|
| <p><u>Others-Please specify</u></p> |
|-------------------------------------|

B2 Which targets have been set, if any, at the LEA level to support the CMF measures? Please summarise them in the table below.

| Target/Indicator | Target | By when | Have baselines been set? |
|---|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>E.g. Reduce incidents of vandalism</i> | <i>Reduce by 10%</i> | <i>December 03</i> | <i>Yes or No</i> |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

C LEA Monitoring Activities

C1 Does the LEA monitor CMF expenditure?

Yes No

C2 Does the LEA monitor the impact of CMF security measures in schools?

Yes No ***If no go to C5***

C3 What is measured, how, how often and by whom?

C4 Is monitoring taking place at the individual school level?

Yes No

C5 Does the LEA plan to evaluate the CMF measures implemented?

Yes No ***If no go to C7***

C6 Please, describe what is intended, including method to be followed.

C7 Will individual schools be responsible for evaluation?

Yes No

C8 Will any evaluation include an assessment of the savings resulting from CMF measures?

Yes No

D Progress to Date

D1 Does the LEA have a delivery plan, with timed milestones, for implementing the CMF funded security measures?

Yes No ***If no go to D3***

D2 Is the implementation of CMF funded measures currently on schedule? If not please summarise what is causing delay, and what steps are being taken to rectify?

D3 Will the LEA's CMF money be spent by August 2003?

Yes No

If no please summarise why not and what future delay is expected.

E Implementing the CMF

E1 In the LEA's experience, what were the key planning issues associated with the use of CMF money?

E2 Please state the main issues with the implementation of the CMF funding.

3 SCHOOL SECURITY NEEDS

We would be grateful if you would complete the questions below, to help identify the main school security needs at the national level and inform the development of national policy.

F Policy and Strategy

F1 Does the LEA have a school security policy?

Yes No *If no go to F5*

F2 What drives the LEA 's school security policy?

Risk management
Frequency of incidents

F3 When was the LEA's school security policy was last updated?

F4 How often is the LEA's school security policy reviewed?

F5 Does the LEA have a risk

management policy?

Yes No

F6 Does the LEA have a school security strategy?

Yes No *If no go to F9*

F7 Please summarise the key elements of the LEA's school security strategy stating how often it is reviewed.

F8 What drives the LEA's school security strategy? Please complete the table below, ranking each option on a scale from 1 to 5.

| | Ranking – please tick one box for each | | | | |
|---------------------------------|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>Driver</i> | 1- Very important | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 – Not very important |
| Staff and pupil security | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Insurance claims | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Risk management issues | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Level of incidents | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Nature/seriousness of incidents | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Repair/maintenance costs | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| School resources | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <u>Other-Please specify</u> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

F9 Are individual schools required to have school security policies?

Yes No ***If no go to G1***

F10 Who monitors the school security policies?

School
LEA

F10 Who reviews the school security policies?

School
LEA

F11 How often are the school security policies reviewed?

G School

Security Needs

G1 What does the LEA see as the key security concerns for the schools in its area? Please complete the table below, ranking each concern between 1 to 5.

| | Ranking – please tick one for each | | | | |
|---|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>School security concern</i> | 1 – major concern | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 – minor concern |
| Personal safety of staff and visitors to the school | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Personal safety of pupils | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Burglary/theft (internal) | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Burglary/theft (external) | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Arson (internal) | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Arson (external) | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Vandalism and criminal damage (internal) | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Vandalism and criminal damage (external) | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Intrusion | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Car crime | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <u>Other-Please specify</u> | 1 – major concern | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 – minor concern |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

G2 Who is consulted in the planning of responses to school security issues?

Police Fire Officers

Others - Please specify

H Addressing School Security Needs

H1 Are individual schools required to undertake school security risk assessments?

Yes No ***If no go to H4***

H2 Who is responsible for undertaking the risk assessment?

LEA Schools

H3 Does the LEA provide training for school staff in risk assessments?

Yes No

H4 Has the LEA evaluated the effectiveness of measures funded under the former DfEE School Security grant (operating between 1997/8 and 2001/2)?

Yes No ***If yes go to H6***

H5 Please state any plans to evaluate the effectiveness of measures or the reasons for not evaluating them.

Go to H9

H6 What were the key findings of the evaluation? (describe below, or attach executive summary of report).

H7 How have these findings influenced LEA/school security strategies and the measures implemented?

H8 What extent were the school security measures funded under the CMF monies building on previous School Security grant funding?

H9 What specific school security measures has the LEA found to work particularly well in the past/represent examples of good practice? Please summarise any relevant approaches below, and why they were so successful.

H10 Are there any additional security measures, not currently being implemented, which you feel would improve your LEA's ability to address identified security needs?

| Additional Security Measure | Identified Security Need |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| | |
| | |

| | |
|--|--|
| | |
| | |

If this questionnaire has been completed by someone other than the named individual the questionnaire was sent please enter the name and job title and email address of the person completing.

| |
|--|
| |
|--|

4 DETAIL OF INDIVIDUAL CMF MEASURES

To allow as full a picture of the use of CMF School Security monies to be reported as possible, we would be grateful if you would complete the attached table to describe the measures supported in different schools in your authority.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION

Please use the 'code' for each Measures variable from the table below to complete the pro-formas on the next pages.

| School Security Measure | Code |
|--|------|
| Alarm systems – e.g. intruder or fire alarms, personal alarms/panic buttons | 1 |
| Car park security | 2 |
| CCTV | 3 |
| Communication equipment – e.g. telephones in classrooms/remote or mobile sites | 4 |
| Entry/access control systems – e.g. electronic gates/access systems, improved security at school entrances, door locks and window security | 5 |
| Fencing – e.g. perimeter fencing | 6 |
| Footpaths and visitor routing systems | 7 |
| Improved signage | 8 |
| Security lighting | 9 |
| <u>Other –please describe</u> | 0 |

Thank you very much for completing this survey. Please return your questionnaire to Ipsos-RSL in the prepaid envelope provided.

| School | Security Measure | Summary Description | CMF Cost (£) | Other Cost (£) (and from) | Total Cost (£) | |
|--------------------|------------------|---|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>For example</i> | 6 | <i>Replace perimeter fencing to prevent intrusion</i> | <i>4,000</i> | <i>2,000 from school budget</i> | <i>6,000</i> | |
| | | Objectives | Target/indicator | Target | By (date) | Baselines set? Y/N |
| | | <i>To prevent unauthorised entry or intrusion to school grounds and property.</i> | <i>Reduce incidents of vandalism</i> | <i>Reduce by 10%</i> | <i>March 03</i> | <i>Y</i> |
| School | Security Measure | Summary Description | CMF Cost (£) | Other Cost (£) (and from) | Total Cost (£) | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | Objectives | Target/indicator | Target | By (date) | Baselines set? Y/N |
| | | | | | | |

CMF SCHOOL SECURITY STUDY – CASE STUDY CHECKLIST - LEAs

A Overall School Security Policy and Strategy

1. Who is responsible for school security policies, strategies and implementation in the area – the LEA or the individual schools? Probe for the roles of officers, area officers, headteachers, school governors, councillors etc. Describe, including existence of LEA or individual school policies, strategies and implementation plans. Get copies and summarise main content.
(Probe/identify position for community, voluntary controlled, voluntary aided schools in the area)
2. How do school security policies/strategies fit within the wider risk management strategies?
3. Who is involved in developing and reviewing security policies/strategies (at LEA and school level)? Identify key actors and processes. How often are policies/strategies reviewed?
4. What are the key drivers of the LEA/schools' security policies/strategies? (E.g. insurance claims, maintenance costs and resources, raising standards, availability of funding.)

B Security Needs in the LEA

5. What are the key security concerns for the LEA? Provide support with descriptions of major incidents. How are these concerns identified – probe insurance driven, etc?

(Also probe to ensure security risks arising within the school are covered, e.g. aggressive parents and pupils. How are these types of risks being addressed, and what additional support, such as staff training, could be helpful?)
6. Are these security concerns universal for the LEA or are they specific to certain school(s) with the LEA? If these are for certain school(s), please describe the nature and reasons for the differing security concerns within the LEA, e.g. geography/type of location.
7. How have the security needs changed over the last 3 years? (type, gravity +/-)
8. Has the LEA attempted to estimate the costs that result from these security needs, in terms of money (insured vs. uninsured)?
9. Has the LEA attempted to assess the impact of these security needs in terms of:
 - School staff and teacher sense of safety and control
 - Parent sense of safety for their child in school
 - Pupil sense of safety
 - Pupil academic and social performance

C CMF Security Measures

10. How has the CMF school security funding been used by the LEA? Summarise the main measures implemented and overall vision for the use of the Fund, and how it relates to any LEA security policy/strategy.
11. Describe the process by which the LEA allocated CMF school security funding to individual schools. What worked well and what less so? Probe – were schools involved/consulted post-bid?
12. How were the individual CMF measures selected? What basis or selection process was used to determine which measures would be most appropriate? What evidence was required/presented to support individual measures? Which measure is considered most appropriate in which context and to deal with which problems?

13. Does the LEA consider any of the CMF measures implemented to be particularly innovative? If so describe, including rationale for, and origin of, the concept.
14. Does the LEA have a central implementation/action plan for the use of CMF? **If so collect.** Does the LEA require individual implementation plans for schools receiving funding?
15. How does/will the LEA monitor implementation and outcomes resulting from the CMF measures? To cover:
 - Does the LEA/individual schools have milestones for implementation and targets and baselines for outcomes/impacts?
 - How will outcomes/impacts be monitored?
 - How will LEA spend be monitored at the individual school level, and by the LEA as a whole?
 - Who is/will be responsible for monitoring – LEA, school, both?
16. Does the LEA plan to formally evaluate the use of the CMF? If so, describe proposed approach and timings.
17. Overall, is the LEA/are the schools on schedule with their implementation plans? If any slippage has been identified describe, will time be caught up, and what steps have been taken to negotiate?
18. Is the LEA/are the schools on schedule to spend the CMF allocation by Aug 2003? If not why not – probe for difficulties in capital programming?
19. Have any impacts/outcomes been identified resulting from CMF measures to date? If so, describe.
20. What are the key issues for the LEA in terms of the implementation and use of CMF? (E.g. capital funding, timescales and timetables, fit with previous/current approaches and plans, etc). How well did CMF complement your school security budget, in terms of amount and restrictions on use?

D Overall

21. To what extent does the LEA expect the CMF security measures to address the LEA's main security concerns?
22. Does the LEA feel that the identified security needs are well addressed by the security measures (CMF funded and previous) currently in place? Do any key gaps remain? What other approaches or individual measures could be implemented?
23. What changes would allow the LEA to more effectively address school security needs?
24. Is the LEA able to readily provide their total spend on school security in each of the last 3 years?
 - If Yes, please provide by mainstream, School Security Grant, CMF and other funding, and split by capital and revenue.
 - If No, what would they need to do to provide the figures?
25. What is the role of the LEA in training and support for schools and security measures?
26. What is the role of the LEA in sharing good practice across the establishments in its area? Describe how dissemination/exchange takes place, and if not in place are there any plans to develop?

CMF SCHOOL SECURITY STUDY – CASE STUDY CHECKLIST - SCHOOLS

CMF Measures

1. What security measures have been funded by CMF in the school? Describe each, including their specific objectives and costs (CMF and other funding). Are any measures considered to be particularly innovative? – if so describe.
2. How are they being/will be implemented, and who will be responsible for implementation?
3. Progress to date – what has been implemented to date, check progress against milestones in delivery plans (if available), and will all CMF monies be spent by August 2003?
4. Have targets been set for the measures, and baselines? If so, what are they?
5. How will implementation and outcomes be monitored, including:
 - Monitoring of expenditure
 - Monitoring of progress with implementation
 - Monitoring of outcomes/impacts
 - Who will be responsible for monitoring – the school, the LEA, both?
 - How will monitoring take place – esp for impacts/outcomes?
6. Does the school or LEA plan to formally evaluate the impact of the CMF measures on the school? If Yes describe methodology and timings.
7. Have any impacts/positive changes been identified resulting from the CMF measures to date? (*Probe for pupil and staff safety, pupil academic and social performance, financial savings, reduced disruption, etc*). If so, describe. If not, what is expected?
8. How were the individual measures being implemented decided on/what was the rationale for their selection? (*Part of existing school/LEA security or risk management strategy, a response to an identified need specific to the school, building on existing measures, etc*)
9. How closely does the school work with the LEA on security matters? (*Probe for level – strategic and/or operational, and frequency of contact*)
10. What have been the key issues for the school in planning and implementing their CMF-funded measures? (*E.g. any issues around slippage, supply and installation, training, capital funding, etc*)

School Security Concerns

11. Is security a particular issue for the school? Summarise main issues and scale.
12. What are the most pressing security concerns for your school? How are these identified? Probe for: in school grounds, at the perimeter and beyond perimeter; within premises or the premises themselves.
13. How have these changed over the last 3 years? Has the school's security policy been reviewed/updated over this time? If Yes, how were the changes in security concerns reflected in the policy documents?

Addressing School Security Issues

*(Referring to how school identifies and co-ordinates **all** security issues and responses, not just those funded via CMF)*

14. Does the school keep a record of security incidents? If so, how and how are incidents classified? Who records the incident and how/who uses the information generated in the school and LEA?
15. How does the school identify and implement responses to school security issues - how are suitable measures identified? *(Probe for existence of school-level security policy/strategy and risk assessment – collect if available).*
16. In the past, how well have available resources (e.g.. the former School Security Grant, school mainstream budgets, other funding sources) been able to address these needs? What has influenced the focus of security spend on an annual basis over the last 3 years?
17. What training in school security issues have school staff received over the past 3 years? *(Probe for subject, source, accreditation, how useful, and changes resulting).* Are there areas where additional training would be useful? – describe.
18. What has been particularly effective/innovative in addressing school security concerns? Are there any approaches which are effective but do not require funding (e.g. playground supervision negating the need for costly door controls).
19. Have any specific security issues been particularly challenging to address? – if so describe.
20. To what extent does the school expect the CMF measures to address the key security concerns described above? How will they build on previous/current measures?
21. To what extent has the school benefited from the exchange of good practice between schools or the LEA? Describe any dissemination/networking approaches to exchange good practice, on a formal or informal basis.
22. Where would the school turn to first for advice on school security issues? If not the LEA, then who?

Responsibility For Health & Safety In Schools

Health and safety responsibilities derive from *the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974* and associated regulations. Health and safety legislation is enforced by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The Act places overall responsibility for health and safety on the employer.

For community schools, community special schools, voluntary controlled schools, maintained nursery schools and pupil referral units the employer is the LEA.

For foundation schools, foundation special schools and voluntary aided schools the employer is the governing body.

For independent schools the employer is the governing body or proprietor.

The employer must ensure "so far as is reasonably practicable" the health, safety and welfare at work of all its employees. This includes providing:

- a safe place of work
- safe systems of work
- a safe working environment
- adequate information, instruction and training about health and safety issues.

The employer must also ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that other people apart from employees who are at the workplace are not exposed to health and safety risks.

Employees must take reasonable care for their own health and safety while at work and the health and safety of others who may be affected by their acts or omissions at work. They must cooperate with their employers in health and safety matters, carry out activities in accordance with training and instruction and inform the employer of any serious risk.

LEA responsibilities

The main role for the LEA is to establish and maintain an overall policy for its schools. A policy for security within its schools can be part of this policy. The LEA must monitor performance under the policy and provide support, including resources.

Governors' responsibilities

Governing bodies have health and safety responsibilities as a result of their powers and duties under education legislation, particularly in relation to staff employment and finance. The *Health and Safety at Work Act 1974* gives duties to those who have, to any extent, control of premises. Governing bodies are required to take all reasonable steps within their power to ensure that school premises are safe and without risks to health.

In LEA-maintained schools there is shared responsibility between the LEA and governing body which sets a more detailed strategy for the school and sets and

monitors its own health and safety objectives and performance standards. The governing body prioritises actions where resources are required and ensure actions are taken. The governing body is required to produce an annual report on health and safety. Under the *Occupiers Liability Acts 1957 and 1974* the governing body is responsible for the state of the school premises.

The governing bodies of foundation, foundation special and voluntary aided schools, and some independent schools, as employers have overall responsibility for health and safety.

School Funding Arrangements For Health & Safety Issues

LEAs' fair funding schemes should retain sufficient power to ensure they meet their health and safety responsibilities and that necessary work is carried out. The schemes should require governing bodies to:

- supply all financial and other information to enable the LEA to be sure that the school is managing its budget satisfactorily;
- have due regard to the LEA's responsibilities for health and safety;
- assess in advance where relevant the health and safety competence of contractors taking account of the LEA's policies and procedures.
- Schools may take advice on health and safety from other bodies but must heed the policy of the LEA.
- Schemes should allow the LEA to pay for (and recoup the costs for) health and safety work for which it is liable where funds have been delegated to schools for such work but where the work was not done.
- Schemes should also allow the LEA to recoup the costs of necessary health and safety training for staff from a school when funding for training is delegated but suitable training has not taken place.
- LEAs can hold back funds to cover strategic management of health and safety i.e. establishing policies and setting standards, providing competence at a strategic level, carrying out active and reactive monitoring, reviewing the policies and standards, and advising schools.

Crime in York Schools 06-07 Data prepared by Safer York Partnership

| SCHOOL | ASSAULT | AUTO CRIME | BURGLARY | CRIMINAL DAMAGE | FRAUD | OTHER SERIOUS OFFENCES | SEXUAL OFFENCES | THEFTS | Grand Total |
|----------------------------------|---------|------------|----------|-----------------|-------|------------------------|-----------------|--------|-------------|
| ACOMB PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ALL SAINTS RC COMPREHENSIVE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 9 |
| APPLEFIELDS | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 |
| ARCHBISHOP HOLGATES | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 16 |
| ARCHBISHOP OF YORK C OF E JUNIOR | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| BADGER HILL PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 |
| BURTON GREEN PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| CANON LEE | 5 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 15 |
| CARR INFANT | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 |
| CARR JUNIOR | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| CLIFTON GREEN PRIMARY | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 |
| DANESGATE PUPIL SUPPORT CENTRE | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| DERWENT INFANT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| DERWENT JUNIOR | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| DRINGHOUSES PRIMARY | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 11 |
| ENGLISH MARTYRS RC PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| FULFORD | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 10 |
| HAXBY ROAD PRIMARY | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| HEMLAND PRIMARY | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| HOB MOOR INFANT | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| HOB MOOR JUNIOR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| HOB MOOR OAKS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| HUNTINGTON PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| HUNTINGTON | 5 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 25 |
| JOSEPH ROWNTREE | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12 |
| KNAVESMIRE PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| LAKESIDE PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| LOWFIELD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 18 |
| MANOR C OF E | 2 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 11 |
| MILLTHORPE | 1 | 1 | 5 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 47 |

Cont... ..


Cont/d.....

| SCHOOL | ASSAULT | AUTO CRIME | BURGLARY | CRIMINAL DAMAGE | FRAUD | OTHER SERIOUS OFFENCES | SEXUAL OFFENCES | THEFTS | Grand Total |
|--------------------------------|---------|---------------|----------|--------------------|-------|------------------------------|--------------------|--------|----------------|
| NORTHFIELD | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| OAKLANDS | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 18 |
| OSBALDWICK PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| OUR LADYS RC PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| PARK GROVE | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| RALPH BUTTERFIELD | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ROBERT WILKINSON PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| SCARCROFT PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| SKELTON PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ST AELREDS RC PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| ST BARNABUS | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ST GEORGES RC PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ST LAWRENCES C OF E PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| ST OLAVS | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ST PAULS C OF E PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ST PETERS | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 11 |
| STEINER | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| THE MOUNT | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| WESTFIELD PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| WOODTHORPE PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| YEARSLEY GROVE PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| YORK STEINER | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 |
| Grand Total | 35 | 11 | 50 | 90 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 101 | 295 |

Architectural Liaison Officer Report

| Crimes at York Schools | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Crime Analysis Study Area | Using initial keywords of 'School' or 'pupil' |
| Details of Search | Locations checked to make sure on school premises |
| Study Period Start: | 01/04/2006 |
| Study Period End: | 31/03/2007 |
| Date Study Completed | 21/05/2007 |
| No. of Months in Study Period | 12 |
| Geocoding Accuracy Rate | 95% |

| Crime Group | Total |
|------------------------|------------|
| Assault | 35 |
| Auto Crime | 11 |
| Burglary | 50 |
| Criminal Damage | 90 |
| Fraud | 1 |
| Other Serious Offences | 4 |
| Sexual Offences | 3 |
| Thefts | 101 |
| Grand Total | 295 |

A Table of Crime in the Study Area (Above) and corresponding Graph (Below)**A Table of Crime by Crime Group and then Crime Type**

| CRIME GROUP | DESCRIPTION | Total |
|------------------------|---|-------|
| ASSAULT | COMMON ASSAULT ETC. | 10 |
| | OTHER WOUNDING ETC. | 21 |
| | PUBLIC ORDER OFFENCES | 2 |
| | WOUNDING OR OTHER ACT ENDANGERING LIFE | 2 |
| AUTO CRIME | AGGRAVATED TAKING OF VEH BY INJURY DAMAGE THEFT FROM VEHICLE | 1 10 |
| BURGLARY | BURGLARY IN A BUILDING OTHER THAN A DWELLING | 50 |
| CRIMINAL DAMAGE | CRIMINAL DAMAGE OTHER | 22 |
| | CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO DWELLINGS | 1 |
| | CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO OTHER BUILDINGS | 62 |
| | CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO VEHICLES | 4 |
| | CRIMINAL DAMAGE ENDANGERING LIFE (OTHER BUILDINGS) | 1 |
| FRAUD | OTHER FORGERY OR UTTERING | 1 |
| OTHER SERIOUS OFFENCES | FIREARMS ACTS OFFENCES | 1 |
| | KIDNAPPING ETC. | 1 |
| | TRAFFICKING IN CONTROLLED DRUGS | 2 |
| SEXUAL OFFENCES | INDECENT ASSAULT ON A FEMALE | 3 |

Annex D

| | | |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-----|
| THEFTS | OTHER THEFT OR UNAUTHORISED TAKING | 54 |
| | ROBBERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY | 1 |
| | THEFT FROM THE PERSON OF ANOTHER | 5 |
| | THEFT OF PEDAL CYCLE | 41 |
| Grand Total | | 295 |

A Table of Crime by Month of the Year and Hour of the Day in the Study Area


| Month | Total |
|-------------|-------|
| Jan | 27 |
| Feb | 16 |
| Mar | 41 |
| Apr | 17 |
| May | 28 |
| Jun | 35 |
| Jul | 22 |
| Aug | 10 |
| Sep | 25 |
| Oct | 19 |
| Nov | 29 |
| Dec | 26 |
| Grand Total | 295 |

| Crime Day | Total |
|-------------|-------|
| Mon | 45 |
| Tue | 48 |
| Wed | 56 |
| Thu | 43 |
| Fri | 59 |
| Sat | 29 |
| Sun | 15 |
| Grand Total | 295 |

Expected Average Crime per Month = 24.6

Expected Average Crime per Day = 42.1

A Graph of Crime by Hour of the Day in the Study Area



A Table of Crime by Hour of the Day in the Study Area

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 01:00 | 02:00 | 03:00 | 04:00 | 05:00 | 06:00 | 07:00 | 08:00 | 09:00 | 10:00 | 11:00 | 12:00 |
| Total per Hour | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 29 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 27 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 13:00 | 14:00 | 15:00 | 16:00 | 17:00 | 18:00 | 19:00 | 20:00 | 21:00 | 22:00 | 23:00 | 00:00 |
| Total per Hour | 29 | 13 | 22 | 15 | 24 | 32 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 3 | 7 |

Report Produced by Ian Cunningham Crime Analyst, SYP